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Abstract
By extending the established theoretical models of electoral competition
with entry (eg. Palfrey (1984)) to incorporate simultaneous competition for
multiple districts I produce a unique two party equilibrium under plurality
rule with non-centrist party platforms. This equilibrium also precludes entry
of additional parties. This result is used to provide a domain for which
Duverger's Law could be expected to apply. I also present new results under
the run-o rule for both the single district and multiple district frameworks.
In the single district case I nd that for the run-o rule the model is more
consistent with empirical observation than it is for the plurality rule, but that
this performance is reversed when we consider multiple districts. The paper
also sheds some light on how the dierent levels of elections in the U.S. and
other systems relate to each other.

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1 Introduction
It is an overwhelming, and often cited, empirical fact that plurality rule elections involving
single member districts typically produce a two party competition structure, and that
these two parties choose non-centrist platforms.
1
Simultaneously, theoretical models of
electoral competition under a plurality rule lead to either platform convergence or the
entry of more than two parties.
2
It is important to resolve this paradox if we are to
understand party behavior in the process of electoral competition.
I propose to extend the theoretical models of electoral competition with entry by as-
suming that the parties are competing in multiple single member districts simultaneously
and that they are constrained to establishing a single party platform for all districts. I
then show that as long as the distributions of voters in these districts are not identical
an equilibrium under plurality rule which involves only two parties can exist in general
conditions and that it is non-centrist. Limits on the dispersion of the voter distribution
across districts can be calculated to establish boundaries within which Duverger's Law
could be expected to apply (that is, when the equilibrium involves at most two parties).
Such a restricted domain for Duverger's Law is appropriate because, as mentioned, em-
pirically the law does not hold everywhere. The performance of the model under the
run-o rule will also be established.
2 The Basic Model
In this section I will be considering a model of electoral competition with entry in a single
district. There will be two incumbent parties who choose their platforms simultaneously.
A potential entrant then makes an entry decision, and if he chooses to enter he selects
a platform position. The entered parties then engage in the election. This is identical
to Palfrey (1984), except that the entrant may be allowed to choose whether to enter
the election at all. This structure is actually more general than it seems. It will be seen
that one party can never prevent the entry of a second party and so if we allow them to
choose sequentially then the rst player will act as if there is a second player anyway and
choose the same platform as it would have if the parties had chosen simultaneously.
3 ;4
Also, if the rst potential entrant chooses to stay out then we can say that all potential
entrants (who similarly consider their entry decision in isolation) would stay out and so
1
For support of Duverger's Law see the references in Riker's (1982) survey. In Riker's view, \There
are indeed counterexamples [to the law], but not, I believe, denitive ones..." (Riker 1982, p.760). For
support of the non-convergence assertion, at least for the case of the U.S., see Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995, chapter 2).
2
For models predicting platform convergence see, for example, Downs (1957), or Fedderson, Sened
and Wright (1990). Examples of models involving the entry of more than two parties are Palfrey (1984),
and Cox (1987).
3
This was shown formally in Weber (1992).
4
In the single district case we would need to retain the assumption that indierent voters would
randomize over the rst two parties. In the multiple districts case entry of a second party cannot be
deterred, even without this assumption, as long as the distribution of districts is not degenerate.
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we have solved for a model involving an arbitrary number of parties. I will denote the
two incumbents as I
1
and I
2
, and the entrant as E.
The issue space is the real line, <. There is a continuum of voters with symmetric,
single peaked preferences over the issue space. The voters ideal points are distributed
according to a non-degenerate cumulative distribution function, F , dened on <. The
associated pdf is denoted f . F and f have the following properties:
Assumption 1 If F () > 0, and  < 0, then F is strictly increasing
on (; ).
Assumption 2 F is continuous and twice dierentiable on <.
Assumption 3 F (x) = 1  F (x) 8x 2 <:
Assumption 4 f
0
(x)  0 8x  0; and f
0
(x)  0 8x  0:
These assumptions specify that the distribution of ideal points for voters is symmetric
about zero, and that the mass at any point is at least as great as at any point further from
zero. This requires f to be quasi-concave. It can be seen that the uniform distribution is
one boundary of such distributions. Assumption 1 ensures that there are no gaps in the
distribution but without assuming that voter ideal points span all of < (that is, voter
ideal points can be contained in a bounded interval, for example [-1,1]).
Voters are assumed to be sincere and so vote for the party closest to their ideal point.
I will further assume that if a voter is indierent between the two incumbents then they
randomize, but if they are indierent between an incumbent and the entrant then they
vote for the incumbent.
5 ;6
This assumption prevents entrants from wanting to locate on
top of an incumbent. It can be defended simply, by claiming that voters have a preference
for established parties if all else is the same. Any ties in the election are then decided
randomly. Denote voter i's ideal point v
i
and, in an abuse of notation, let I
1
; I
2
and E
represent the parties electoral platforms.
Assumption 5 If jv
i
  Ej < jv
i
  I
j
j for j = 1; 2 then vote(i) = E: Otherwise, vote(i) =
I
j
if jv
i
  I
j
j < jv
i
  I
k
j where j; k = 1; 2 and j 6= k: If jv
i
  I
1
j = jv
i
  I
2
j then
prob[vote(i) = I
j
] =
1
2
for j = 1; 2:
It should be noted here that this assumption does not place any restrictions on the
voter's utility function other than that utility is decreasing in the distance from his
5
This assumption is not needed for any of the plurality results. In fact, it was not made by Palfrey
(1984). However, it is crucial to the run-o results, as otherwise entry prevention would not be possible
in any district (the entrant could locate on top of either incumbent and obtain a positive probability
of victory). I make the assumption for all models in order to facilitate comparisons between the two
electoral rules.
6
Alternatively, we could assume that ties in the overall election between an incumbent and the entrant
are decided in favor of the incumbent, and that ties between incumbents are decided randomly.
3
ideal point. More specically, a quadratic loss utility function is allowable with this
assumption.
Parties are free to locate at any point in the policy space, <. I will assume that parties
have lexicographic preferences with probability of victory on the primary dimension and
vote share on a second dimension.
7
So if a party has a set of points which maximize its
probability of winning then it chooses the point in this set that maximizes its vote share.
If there is more than one point that maximizes a party's utility then it is assumed that
the party randomizes equally over these points.
8
A more substantial problem is that there may not exist a vote maximizing choice for
the entrant. This technicality arises when E attempts to maximize his vote share over
the set of points that maximizes his probability of winning. The probability of winning
for E can only take on a nite set of values (as we have only three parties and voting
is deterministic) and so a set of maximizers over this dimension can always be found.
To deal with this existence problem I shall use the limit equilibrium concept introduced
by Palfrey (1984). I shall assume that if a maximum doesn't exist then the entrant
`almost' maximizes his vote share when choosing from the set of points which maximize
his probability of winning. A perturbed game is dened for each ", where " is how close
E comes to maximizing his vote share. An equilibrium is then dened as any pair of
strategies for I
1
and I
2
which are best responses to each other for an innite sequence of
the perturbed games, with the perturbation approaching zero in the limit.
Letting W denote the winner of the election, the set of points that maximize the
entrant's probability of victory is dened as follows.
X(I
1
; I
2
) = argmax
x2<
fprob(W = EjE = x)jI
1
; I
2
g
Letting V
E
denote the entrant's vote share, the set of points that E equally randomizes
over, for a given ", is given by C
"
E
, where,
7
Once again, the plurality results would not change if instead we assumed that parties simply vote
maximize. This was the approach of Palfrey (1984). However, when considering the entrant's decision
under the run-o rule vote maximization and the maximization of probability of victory do not necessarily
coincide. As the probability of victory dictates the entry decision of this party it would then seem natural
to assume that this rule also dictates the location decision. As above, the assumption is made for both
models in order to facilitate comparison.
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We can refer to a party's utility level as even though they have lexicographic preferences their
preferences are representable by a utility function. This is because the rst dimension of preferences,
probability of victory, can take on only a nite number of values (0;
1
3
;
1
2
; 1), and the second dimension,
vote share, can be mapped into the interval [0,1]. An example of such an utility function is given by,
U =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
V
1 + V
2 + V
3 + V
if P = 0
if P =
1
3
if P =
1
2
if P = 1
9
>
>
=
>
>
;
4
C"
E
(I
1
; I
2
) = fE 2 X(I
1
; I
2
)jV
E
(I
1
; I
2
; E) > V
E
(I
1
; I
2
; y)  "; 8y 2 X(I
1
; I
2
)g
Anticipating this entry decision the expected utility for the incumbents, given their own
locations, is the expectation over C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
). Denote their expected utilities by U
"
1
(I
1
; I
2
)
and U
"
2
(I
1
; I
2
).
Denition 1 [Palfrey (1984)] A pair of locations, fI
1
; I
2
g, is a limit equilibrium if,
(a) for every y 6= I
1
, there is a number "(y), such that for all " 2 (0; "(y));
U
"
1
(y; I
2
) < U
"
1
(I
1
; I
2
): And,
(b) for every w 6= I
2
, there is a number "(w), such that for all " 2 (0; "(w));
U
"
2
(I
1
; w) < U
"
2
(I
1
; I
2
).
It is possible that if X(I
1
; I
2
) is not a singleton then E will randomize over one or
several intervals. The entrant will locate, if I
1
 I
2
, in some subset of the intervals
(I
1
  ; I
1
); (I
2
; I
2
+ ) and (x  ; x+ ), where x 2 (I
1
; I
2
) and  and  are determined
from ". As " ! 0 these intervals typically get smaller and  ! 0 and  ! 0. We
shall denote these types of intervals, as represented in this example, by I
 
1
; I
+
2
and x
 +
,
respectively.
I will be considering the equilibria under two voting rules, and two dierent assump-
tions on entrant behavior. The voting rules will be plurality and run-o. Under plurality
the party that gains the most votes, regardless of whether this constitutes a majority,
wins the election. Under run-o the party with the smallest number of votes is eliminated
from the ballot and the remaining parties compete again with the same platforms (eec-
tively preferences on votes for the eliminated candidate are distributed to the remaining
candidates). When we get down to two remaining parties it is the one with a majority
that wins the election. This process can be carried out with only one ballot and voters
ranking the candidates, or in a series of ballots. In this model of full information and
sincere voting the two techniques are equivalent. It will be seen that the two voting rules
produce vastly dierent equilibria.
Under the run-o rule I will assume that from the set of points that maximize a parties
probability of winning, the party will choose one of those that (almost) maximizes its
primary vote share. The primary vote share for a party is the proportion of voters whose
rst preference is that party. This objective was chosen as, at least in Australia, the
results from run-o elections report primary vote levels and which party is the winner.
They do not report which parties survived the rounds. This run-o information can
be easily kept out of public view if, like Australia, the single ballot technique in which
voters rank the candidates is employed. Thus, as we would expect parties to be aiming
for public prominence then maximizing their primary vote share would seem the most
natural objective.
The assumptions on entrant behavior revolve around whether the party would enter
even if it knew it wasn't going to win. In the rst treatment I will assume that one entrant
5
(and only one entrant) will enter no matter what, even if its probability of winning is
zero. This is the assumption used by Palfrey (1984). The second treatment will assume
that the potential entrant will enter only if it has a strictly positive probability of victory.
This assumption is used by Fedderson, Sened and Wright (1990). It can be justied in
many ways, such as through a cost of entry variable. It will be seen that these two
alternative assumptions also produce vastly dierent results.
As the parties have no ideological motivation in the selection of their platforms it is
obvious that any equilibrium found will point to another equilibrium in which the two
incumbent parties simply switch positions. Any pair of such equilibria will be considered
to be the same, and so constitute just one equilibrium.
All proofs have been relegated to the appendix. Here I will just present the results and
an intuitive explanation. The equilibria themselves are very intuitive, the complication
is in proving that they are unique.
Before I present the equilibria I will present some intuition about the results.
Run-o If the incumbents do not locate symmetrically then the entrant will locate just
outside the one closest to the center, thereby trapping this party in the middle
and eliminating it in the rst round. By choosing close enough to this incumbent
the entrant will then be closer to the center than the other incumbent and so win
the second stage runo. This is assuming that the gap in the middle isn't too
big. If this is the case then the entrant can locate just inside the incumbent party
closest to the center and squeeze it on the outside and then win the run o with the
incumbent on the other side. So to prevent the entrant winning, the incumbents
will locate symmetrically and not too far from the center.
9
So incumbents do not
have incentive to move from a symmetric location pair as this will incite the entrant
to enter and win.
Plurality If the incumbents are on the same side of the center then the entrant can
locate in the middle and win the election with a majority. So this can't constitute
an equilibrium, and the incumbents must locate on opposite sides of the center (the
median voter). They can't locate too far apart either, as then the entrant could
locate between them and win the election. Likewise if the incumbents are located
too asymmetrically around the center (eg. I
1
t 0 and I
2
  I
1
, then an entrant
with E = I
 
1
would win the election). If these requirements are not violated then an
entrant who locates on the outside of an incumbent steals all of its votes from this
incumbent, but the other incumbent still has too many votes to enable its defeat
9
For some distributions there may exist unique asymmetric incumbent platforms that preclude entry.
However, these will not constitute equilibria as the widest party will always lose and so will have incentive
to deviate towards the center. These points require one incumbent to be relatively far from the center.
Consequently these points cannot be reached by a single protable deviation if the incumbents are close
enough to the center. Thus, if the incumbents choose symmetric positions close enough to the center they
will be in equilibrium. The limit of this dispersion will be seen in the characterization of the equilibria
in the next section.
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as well. The entrant can't simultaneously punish both incumbents suciently.
If the entrant has positive cost then he will never enter and so the incumbents
have a two party game and their unbridled incentive to move inwards leads to
convergence. This intuition is the basis of the convergence result in Fedderson,
Sened and Wright (1990). If the entrant will enter no matter what then by moving
to the center an incumbent provides more space on its ank and encourages the
entrant to enter there, which is bad for that incumbent. Thus we have a countering
force to convergence and so, potentially, a non-centrist equilibrium. This is the
intuition of the non-centrist equilibrium result of Palfrey (1984).
3 Results I
3.1 Enter no matter what
3.1.1 Run-o
(a) There exists an innite number of equilibria, fI
1
; I
2
g = fx; xg 8x 2 [W

; 0]; where
W

solves 1 2F (
W

2
) = F (W

): If x = W

then E 2 fI
 
1
; I
+
2
; 0
 +
g for all F .
10
If
x 6= W

then E 2 fI
 
1
; I
+
2
; g. For all equilibria, prob(W = I
1
) = prob(W = I
2
) =
1
2
; prob(W = E) = 0:
(b) Depending on F , there may exist additional equilibria which satisfy the following
necessary, but not sucient conditions, fI
1
; I
2
g = fy; yg where y 2 [F
 1
(
1
4
);W

)
and F (
y
2
) 
1
3
: E 2 0
 +
for all such equilibria. prob(W = I
1
) = prob(W = I
2
) =
1
2
; prob(W = E) = 0:
**Insert gure 1 here**
Entry will aect each incumbent equally, and so each will still have equal chance of
winning the election. The entrant has zero probability of winning the election. Except in
the case of x = W

the entrant randomizes over entering on the two anks. The entrant
squeezes one of the incumbents out in the rst round but is then defeated by the other
incumbent in the runo. If x = W

then the entrant will randomize over the anks and
zero for all F other than the uniform. When F is uniform the entrant can randomize over
the center interval as well as the anks. As described in the previous section, deviation
by the incumbents provides scope for the entrant to win, so neither moves and we have
many equilibria. Notice that if x < F
 1
(
1
4
) then this violates the `too far apart' intuition
and the entrant could choose E = x +  ( > 0) and crowd I
1
on the ank and then
defeat I
2
in the runo as it is closer to the center. It should be noted that of the equilibria
in (a), x = W

is the only one in which the entrant is defeated in the rst round.
10
If F is uniform then 0
 +
 (I
1
; I
2
), and so as "! 0 the interval doesn't collapse.
7
The second group of equilibria presented above are dicult to characterize as they
depend critically on the particular distribution of voters in the electorate. The rst group
of equilibria are independent of the particular F , as long as F satises the assumptions of
the model. Thus, under the run-o rule we have, at the least, a continuum of equilibria in
which the entrant never wins the election. And, independent of F , all equilibria require
the incumbents to be located symmetrically about the middle, and on all but a set of
measure zero involve non-centrist platforms.
The group of candidate equilibria in (b) may not be equilibria as even though in the
limit E 2 I
+
1
may not lead to E having a positive probability of winning, there could
still exist a point E = I
1
+ ;  > 0, such that E has a strictly positive chance of
winning the election. Whether such a point exists will depend on F and the locations
of the incumbents. The incumbent locations in (a) prevent the existence of such points,
which can be seen from the denition of W

. If a pair of incumbent locations are not in
the domain of (a) or (b) then such a point must exist and so they cannot constitute an
equilibrium.
3.1.2 Plurality
There exists a unique equilibrium, fI
1
; I
2
g = fy; yg where 1   2F (
y
2
) = F (y); E 2
fI
 
1
; I
+
2
; 0
 +
g for all F . prob(W = I
1
) = prob(W = I
2
) =
1
2
; prob(W = E) = 0:
The entrant never wins and the two incumbents each have a
1
2
probability of winning
the election as the location of the entrant aects both parties equally. The incentive for
an incumbent to deviate towards the center is tempered by the resultant added incentive
for the entrant to enter on that ank. The equilibrium is the exact point where further
deviation inwards will ensure that the entrant locates on the deviating incumbent's ank.
This is the same equilibrium found by Palfrey (1984), but on a more general policy
space, and with slightly dierent assumptions on parties objective functions and voter
behavior. The non-centrist equilibrium found here relies critically on the assumption
that the entrant will enter despite having zero probability of victory.
3.2 Enter only if have a positive probability of victory
3.2.1 Run-o
(a) There exists an innite number of equilibria, fI
1
; I
2
g = fx; xg 8x 2 [W

; 0]; where
W

solves 1   2F (
W

2
) = F (W

): E =  (doesn't enter). For all equilibria,
prob(W = I
1
) = prob(W = I
2
) =
1
2
; prob(W = E) = 0:
(b) Depending on F , there may exist additional equilibria which satisfy the following nec-
essary, but not sucient conditions, fI
1
; I
2
g = fy; yg where y 2 [F
 1
(
1
4
);W

) and
F (
y
2
) 
1
3
: E =  (doesn't enter). prob(W = I
1
) = prob(W = I
2
) =
1
2
; prob(W =
E) = 0:
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The entrant stays out. If an incumbent deviates then, as above, the entrant could win
the election. So if the incumbent deviated we would see the reaction by the entrant to
enter and win the election. Thus, we have the same incentives as when facing compulsory
entry and so the same incumbent equilibria.
3.2.2 Plurality
A pure strategy equilibrium does not exist.
We can see that for any symmetric location of the incumbent parties an inward
deviation can always be found that is small enough so that even though entering on this
party's ank will uniquely maximize the entrant's vote share it will still have zero chance
of winning the election. This can be seen through the intuition that entry on a ank will
only steal votes from one candidate and so give the election to the candidate on the other
side of the median. Consequently, under this assumption of entrant behavior such a party
will not enter, and so the disincentive for incumbent parties to shift inwards disappears.
This then rules out the non-centrist equilibrium of section 3.1.2. Asymmetric equilibria
are also eliminated as the incumbent furthest from the center has positive incentive to
at least shift to a symmetric position.
Fedderson, Sened and Wright (1990) extract an equilibrium from a framework similar
to this by assuming that voters are able to vote strategically. By this they mean that
groups of voters are able to coordinate and ensure that a preferred candidate wins the
election. Their unique equilibrium is fI
1
; I
2
g = f0; 0g. In the model presented here an
entrant could locate at E = , where  is small, and win the election with less than a
majority as the incumbents would split the rest of the vote. In this situation the entrant
is able to steal votes o both incumbents, and thus punish both suciently to win the
election. However, if  > 0 then Fedderson et. al. assume that all voters with ideal
points less than zero are able to coordinate on one of the incumbents and ensure that
the chosen incumbent wins the election (and vice versa for  < 0). In anticipation of this
ability the potential entrant does not enter. This assumption removes the ability of the
entrant to punish both incumbents with its entry and so removes its ability to win the
election. Consequently this produces an equilibrium as the incumbent parties are now
happy to locate at the median voter.
The various results of the preceding sections are summarized in the following table.
Enter no matter what Enter only if have a
positive probability of victory
Run-o Continuum of Continuum of
non-centrist equilibria non-centrist equilibria
Plurality Unique non-centrist No pure strategy
equilibrium equilibria
9
Remark
It is hard to say which assumption of entrant behavior is the more appropriate. In
a repeated model we can certainly imagine an entrant who enters despite having zero
probability of victory in the current period. They may have aspirations for future electoral
success and need to start building a support base at the expense of other parties, or they
may simply want to have a voice and feel that the cost of entry is outweighed by the
value of the audience that electoral participation brings.
11
Though, we must then ask
why there is only one such party, and not many of them? Consequently, in this one
shot model that we are presenting here it would seem inappropriate. If we manage to
represent a dynamic model then hopefully these considerations could be accounted for.
However, there is one further criticism of the assumption of `entry no matter what'
that is far more concerning. The assumption implies that the nal outcome should consist
of three competing parties (at least), as the entrant will always contest the election.
However, the empirical fact that we are attempting to explain is that we only observe
two parties. This leads to the conclusion that either the assumption of compulsory entry
is misguided, or that the framework of two incumbents facing a potential entrant is
inaccurate. Either way the power of the model under this assumption to explain the
phenomena at hand is questionable. An additional problem with this assumption is
the lack of justication for why there is only one potential entrant, particularly if the
probability of victory is of no concern to their entry decision. We are left wondering why,
if there exists one, there isn't more parties poised to enter, and what this would mean
for the equilibria.
The run-o results presented here are, to the best of my knowledge, new. In fact,
formal modeling of the run-o rule is very sparse indeed. In what appears to be the only
formal study of the run-o rule, Osborne and Slivinski (1996) study a model of citizen
candidates under both the plurality and run-o rules. The primary dierence between
the models is that Osborne and Slivinski assume that candidates are policy oriented and
thus, most importantly, policy restricted. That is, a candidate is restricted to select
as his campaign platform his true ideal point. For certain parameter values for cost
of entry and benet of oce they nd that two party, non-centrist equilibria occur. A
similar model was also used in a study of the plurality rule only by Besley and Coate
(1997). A weakness of these models is that they rely too heavily on the denition of a
Nash equilibrium. It may be the case that a candidate would prefer a dierent candidate
to run in his stead, and that this alternative candidate would also prefer this option
(for example, someone fractionally closer to the center who could guarantee electoral
success). However, such deviations are not allowed when determining Nash equilibria
11
The assumption that parties immediately receive the support of all voters for whom they are the
closest party implies a more long term view is captured by this one shot model as diculties of party
establishment, such as name recognition, are assumed away. That is, assuming voters always vote
sincerely implies that if an entrant can't win in the one shot model it won't be able to win no matter
how many periods we model the competition over (unless, of course, its entry incites additional entry).
For a dynamic model to dier from and extend what is presented here we would need to consider
additional party competition for characteristics such as name recognition or platform credibility.
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as they involve the simultaneous deviations of two players. Thus, these models extends
the analysis by adding policy preferences to a candidates objective function but it would
seem that the equilibria produced may not be coalition proof. This extension is the
basis of a broad literature in which candidates are policy motivated and, consequently,
restricted in the platforms and policies they can select. These restrictions are used to
obtain non-centrist platform choices that are signicantly dierent in intuition from the
voluntary choices of the purely Downsian candidates modelled here.
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In contrast, the results presented here for the plurality rule are known, at least in ap-
proximate form. However, the predictions of the model fail to coincide with the empirical
phenomena that we are trying to explain. The model either predicts a three party out-
come, or the absence of an equilibrium altogether. But as was pointed out earlier, under
the plurality rule we most commonly observe two party competition with non-centrist
platforms. The only way to extract a two party outcome is if we make the further as-
sumption of Fedderson, Sened and Wright (1990) as to voter sophistication, but even
then the competing parties will both locate at the median voter. These shortcomings
highlight the absence of a theoretical model that predicts the two party, non-centrist
electoral outcomes we observe when the plurality rule is used.
The predictions of the model under the run-o rule, however, do coincide with em-
pirical observation. The unique use of the run-o rule in federal elections has been in
Australia, and there we have seen the emergence of an eective two party electoral system
with non-centrist platforms.
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And as we have seen, the model here produces a continuum
of two party equilibria which, on all but a set of measure zero, are non-centrist.
Despite this agreement of the model and empirical fact, these predictions stand in
conict with established theoretical predictions for the run-o rule. These arguments are
encapsulated in what Riker (1982) refers to as `Duverger's Hypothesis', which covers the
class of electoral rules that were expected to favor multi-partism. This class incorporates
the run-o and proportional representation rules as it was believed that they do not
encourage parties to maximize their vote count and so the incentive to rationalize into
only two parties was absent. However, the results presented here indicate that the ability
of two parties to prevent successful competition from additional parties limits the number
of competing parties to two, in contrast to the prediction of Duverger.
The results of this section for the plurality rule are concerning. The lack of a rea-
sonable theoretic justication for two party, non-centrist outcomes makes it dicult to
conclude that we understand the process of platform selection by competing parties. It
is in pursuit of this understanding that we now turn to the extended model.
12
See Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985).
13
Riker (1992).
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4 The Extended Model
We are left with the problem of explaining why, under plurality rule, parties choose non-
centrist platforms. If we look closer at the empirical phenomena that we are trying to
explain we notice that the assumption of a single district is not appropriate. Political
parties compete in many districts simultaneously. For example, in the U.S. there are
435 congressional districts that elect a representative simultaneously, and the two main
parties compete in most, if not all, of these districts at every election. The candidates in
each district are associated with their nominating party and so all candidates from the
one party eectively compete with the same platform.
When we expand the framework under consideration in this way by extending the
analysis to simultaneous competition for multiple districts we reverse the ndings of the
previous sections and nd that a stable, non-centrist equilibrium exists under plural-
ity rule, and that run-o results in entry and instability. This result serves to ll the
hole in our understanding of electoral competition under the plurality rule, and brings
the prediction for the run-o rule into line with the prediction of Duverger (and Riker).
However, this also means that our prediction is no longer consistent with the electoral
situation in Australia. This discrepancy in theoretical prediction and empirical observa-
tion for the run-o rule now becomes the open question in this area. However, with only
one data point as the basis of this discrepancy its importance should not be overstated.
To incorporate these extensions into the model I will make the following further
assumptions.
Assumption 6 There exists a continuum of districts where district i has the median
voter's ideal point being Z
i
. Z
i
is distributed symmetrically about 0 (the mean of
the original district) on the support [Z;Z], where Z =  Z: The distribution of Z
0
i
s
is represented by the cdf G, where G(Z) = 0 and G(Z) = 1. The associated pdf is
g, which is continuous and can be either strictly quasi-concave or quasi-convex.
14
The distribution of voters ideal points in district i is given by the cdf F (x Z
i
) for
all x 2 <:
Assumption 7 Each of the two incumbent parties must choose a single platform on
which they will compete in every electorate.
Without the constraint of assumption 7 the additional districts would not constitute
a dierent approach as the single district results would apply in each district separately.
The assumption of a continuum of districts is, of course, not realistic. However, it has
been employed as it captures the eect and intuition of the multiple district scenario
whilst avoiding the complexity of calculation associated with a lumpy distribution of
14
Note that this permits uniform distributions as they are quasi-convex. The restriction to strict
quasi-concavity is to rule out particular at spots in the distribution that may produce multiple weak
Nash equilibria.
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district median voters. It is in the same spirit as the assumption of a continuum of
voters in the single district case.
With an extended structure the objective function of the parties also has to be ex-
tended. In the multiple district case I shall once again assume that parties have lexico-
graphic preferences. The primary dimension is the expected share of districts that the
party wins in the election, and the second dimension is their total vote share.
15;16
As we
have a continuum of districts it is only natural to talk of `share of districts' rather than
number of districts. This is analogous to the single district case where parties seek to
maximize their vote share over the continuum of voters.
As I am attempting to explain the two party phenomena, from now on I will make
the assumption that parties will enter only if they have a strictly positive probability of
electoral success. This implies a natural modelling of party entry that if a party enters,
though it may enter in many districts simultaneously, it will enter and compete only in
those districts in which it has a positive probability of victory.
To incorporate this assumption about entry I will relax the assumption of only one
potential entrant and instead assume there are many potential entrants, but that only
one will enter in each district, and only if it has a positive probability of victory in that
district. This is assumed in order to simplify the analysis. If there are many potential
entrants for a single district then the entry decisions of these parties are interrelated and
would require a more complicated stage game to be specied. The intention, which is
maintained by the assumption, is that if a single party could enter and win a district
then the incumbents lose that district. This will not require as many entrants as may
be thought. In most instances one entrant, with one platform, will be able to win many
districts from the incumbents. Indeed, for the only equilibrium result specifying entry,
Proposition 3, only two entrants are required to secure all but an arbitrarily small number
of the districts lost by the incumbents.
17
This modeling technique is not as restrictive
as it may seem. In fact, if we assumed that the potential entrants were strategic and
conscious of further entry in districts they attack then as long as the incumbents are on
either side of the median and entry is possible it can be shown that one entrant can secure
victory in a district and prevent further entry.
18;19
This framework is rather general and
15
As governments can be formed with a minority of seats, or by forming a coalition of parties, a
complex model of government formation would need to be incorporated if it were to be assumed that
parties were attempting to maximize their probability of winning government. Consequently, the more
tractable assumption of seat maximization has been made.
16
The second dimension is only required in order to rule out potential equilibria in which neither of
the incumbent parties win any of the districts and are unable to move their platforms anywhere such
that they do. Without the second dimension such locations pairs would constitute an equilibrium even
though we may ask why the incumbents themselves would enter given they have a zero probability of
winning any districts.
17
This is achieved by the entrants locating at points arbitrarily close to each incumbent.
18
For example, if jI
1
j > jI
2
j relative to the district median, and successful entry on the right ank is
possible, then E = I
2
+ ; where 1  F (
I
2
+E
2
) > F (
I
1
+I
2
2
) but 1  F (E) < F (
I
1
+I
2
2
); secures victory for
the entrant but prevents further entry.
19
The assumption of only one entrant in each district allows me to deal with problematic situations
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is consistent with several types of political entrant. It can be seen as covering the entry
of multiple independents into the legislature, or the creation of regional or issue based
parties which pick o certain sections of the electorate.
The Literature
There have been several papers which have considered the issue of multiple districts.
However, they are infrequent in the political theory literature and so the signicance
of the extension has not been fully investigated. The rst investigation of multiple dis-
tricts was by Hinich and Ordeshook (1974) in a study of the electoral college. Hinich
and Ordeshook were interested in distortionary eects of the electoral college in com-
parison to a direct vote for the President. They proved the extension of the single
district case, that with two candidate competition both candidates would converge to
the median of the median district. This result makes two candidate competition in the
multiple district case look almost identical to that in the single district case (though
maybe with a dierent convergent point). This question was examined further in Hinich,
Mickelsen and Ordeshook (1975) where they attempted to assess the potential magnitude
of such distortions through simulations. Further work has been done by Austen-Smith
(1981,1984,1986,1987,1989) in a series of papers. The rst paper is the most similar to
the model presented here as parties are assumed to choose a unique platform which is
applicable for candidates in all districts (assumption 7 here). The question of entry and
entry deterrence is not considered. Austen-Smith investigates the existence of equilibria
when parties compete not only in policy space but in distributive dimensions as well.
Parties are assumed to have a xed campaign budget which has to be allocated to the
districts individually. He shows that under certain conditions an equilibrium will exist.
He also points out that if parties are asymmetrically endowed then this equilibrium will
involve dierent policy platforms. This result is signicantly dierent from that pre-
sented here as it requires an assumption of asymmetric parties and the incorporation of
distributive dimensions to get the non-convergence of party platforms, whereas the result
of this paper does not. In the second paper Austen-Smith takes an alternative approach.
He considers that the nal party platform is some function of the individual choices of
candidates, who are free to choose their positions, and so studies the optimal choice for
individual candidates. This framework is then used in the third and fourth papers to
consider bargaining games in the elected legislature and what this means for individual
vote choice. His nal paper surveys the literature on electing legislatures (which also
includes work on proportional representation and multiple member districts).
in which the incumbents are on the same side of the median, and so wouldn't be expected to win the
district, but where one entrant can't prevent subsequent entry.
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5 Results II
Run-o Suppose Z 6= Z: Then if an equilibrium exists it must involve the entry of more
than two parties.
Notice that in order to prevent entry in the central district the incumbents must be
located symmetrically and no further from the center than [W

; W

]; or in a possible
asymmetric position: Now consider an arbitrary district, r, with median voter other than
at 0. Let the median of this district be Z
r
= ", where " > 0. If the incumbents are located
symmetrically in the central district then they can't be located symmetrically in district
r. Thus, entry will be possible. The entrant can locate at E = I
2
+
"
4
. So the entrant beats
I
2
, who is eliminated in the rst round. The entrant is then closer to the median voter of
r and so wins the runo. As " could be arbitrarily small we can see that if the support
of median voters across all districts is non-degenerate then entry cannot be prevented by
the two incumbents in all districts simultaneously. A similar analysis shows that if the
incumbents are located asymmetrically in the central district and are preventing entry,
then these locations can't prevent entry in districts with dierent medians.
So under a run-o rule the two party, entry excluding, equilibria of the single district
case are not robust to simultaneous competition in many districts. The positive results
for this decision rule which were obtained for the single district fall apart under even the
smallest heterogeneity of districts.
For the case of plurality we will need to dene the following condition.
Condition 1 g(Z) 
2
3
g(0):
20
This condition ensures that the weight of districts with median voters at the boundary
of the distribution is enough so that the incumbents do not have the incentive to abandon
them to entrants by deviating inwards in order to win more districts at the center of the
distribution. Recall that g is assumed to be symmetric, so that Z =  Z; and the same
condition holds for Z: Dene M(j); j = I
1
; I
2
; E; to be the share of the districts won by
party j:
Proposition 1 Suppose 0 > Z  Z

; where Z

satises F (Z

) =
1
3
:
21
Then if condition
1 is satised the unique equilibrium is given by, fI
1
; I
2
g = f2Z; 2Zg; E
i
=  8i
(do not enter). M(I
1
) = M(I
2
) =
1
2
; M(E
i
) = 0 8i:
In the one district case the incumbents had an incentive to deviate towards the center
and win the election. This incentive still exists in the multiple district case. However,
20
Note that this condition only restricts strictly quasi-concave distributions and places no restrictions
on quasi-convex distributions of districts.
21
I should point out that if we were to drop assumption 5 and if Z = Z

, an entrant would be able to
locate at E = I
1
and tie in the district with median at Z; but lose in all other districts. As the district
won has a measure zero then this possibility still wouldn't incite entry. Likewise for entry at I
2
:
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the incumbents reach a point where further deviation in order to win central districts
will allow entry in the districts with the most extreme median voter as in those districts
the `too asymmetric' intuition is violated, and condition 1 ensures that the amount of
districts lost on the edge by deviating inwards outweighs the amount won in the center.
The incumbents win half of the districts each. They tie in the central district, which
is then decided by randomizing. However, as we have a continuum of districts, this
central district has a weight of zero and so doesn't aect the proportion of districts won
by each of the incumbents. If we consider the continuum of districts as the limit of a
nite distribution of districts, then it is only in the limit that the winner of the central
district does not achieve a majority and win government outright.
22
Only occasionally do we observe legislatures where the seats are evenly divided be-
tween the two major parties, or where they are separated by only one seat. It is quite
normal for us to observe legislatures where one party holds a signicant majority. Con-
sequently, it would be desirable if our theoretical model could produce such uneven seat
allocations as an equilibrium. Obviously the equal proportion of seats for the incumbents
predicted by this model is a direct consequence of the symmetry of the set up and so we
would want to relax the symmetry to produce an asymmetric outcome. This is possible
in the multiple district framework presented here as Proposition 1 does not necessarily
rely on the symmetry of g (the statement and use of Condition 1 certainly does, but the
logic of the proof does not). Indeed, as long as an analog of Condition 1 holds (Condi-
tion 1A below) then the equilibrium depends solely upon the width of the distribution
of districts and not on the shape of the distribution (e.g. the mean or the median).
This is an interesting result as it is not automatic that asymmetric distributions pro-
duce asymmetric outcomes for the parties. For example, if we incorporate asymmetric
distributions in models that predict party convergence then the parties still converge to
the median (of the median district in the multiple district case), though this may no
longer be in the geographic center of the distribution. So we may have a dierent set of
platform choices by the parties but they still receive symmetric outcomes. If we consider
the Palfrey model (result 3.1.2 here) then for rather special distributions it is possible to
produce asymmetric outcomes for the incumbents. However, we are left to wonder why
the losing incumbent would itself enter if it had no chance of victory. To produce such a
result we are required to lean even harder on the assumption that parties are willing to
enter an election regardless of their chances of victory. Consequently an interpretation
of asymmetric outcomes in the single district framework is dicult to develop. However,
in the multiple district framework presented here such asymmetric outcomes are easily
conceptualized. Even though the minor incumbent party has no chance of winning a
majority it still wins some districts contested and thus secures a voice in the legislature.
We could also justify entry in this instance as some members of the losing party still gain
personally by winning their own district and this may justify the existence of the party.
To characterize the equilibria for an asymmetric distribution of districts we shall
22
Of course, that the result of plurality 1 still constitutes an equilibrium with only a nite number of
districts remains to be proven.
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need to generalize and strengthen condition 1. To maintain tractability I shall continue
to assume that Z =  Z, though this too could be relaxed.
Condition 1A g(x) >
2
3
g(y) 8x; y 2 [Z;Z]:
The tightening of this condition is required to rule out certain at spots in quasi-
convex distributions. Such an additional restriction was not required in the statement
of Condition 1 as symmetry ensured that even if such at spots existed they would not
cause a problem. This tightening is overly strong. Consequently, whereas Condition
1 was sucient and necessary for the result of Proposition 1 to hold, this condition is
sucient for the following result but not necessary.
23
This leads to a generalization of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1A Suppose 0 > Z  Z

; where Z

satises F (Z

) =
1
3
; and relax the
assumption that g is symmetric. Then if condition 1A is satised the unique equi-
librium is given by, fI
1
; I
2
g = f2Z; 2Zg; E
i
=  8i (do not enter). M(I
1
) =
R
0
Z
g(x)dx;M(I
2
) =
R
Z
0
g(x)dx; M(E
i
) = 0 8i:
We can see immediately that unless G(0) =
1
2
then M(I
1
) 6= M(I
2
) and one of the
incumbent parties will hold an outright majority. Thus we can produce an equilibrium
selection of party platforms such that one party is guaranteed of winning a majority of
the districts. The existence of such equilibria could be used to explain elections where one
party is predicted to win a clear majority and does so, and where the losing party does
not seem to have a platform that could win a majority of the seats.
24
This is consistent
with a common analyst observation that a party has `captured the middle ground.' A
distribution of districts which is skewed to one side would produce such an outcome.
Proposition 2 Suppose Z < Z

. Then if an equilibrium exists it must involve the entry
of more than two parties.
In this situation the dispersion of districts is too broad for the incumbents to compete
successfully in all of them. To satisfy the constraint preventing successful entry at a
point between the incumbents in the central district, the incumbents must leave open
the possibility for successful entry in the extreme districts by violating the `too far apart'
intuition. The result here is, in fact, stronger than what is stated; we could say that
it is impossible for the two incumbents to prevent entry whether they are, or are not,
in equilibrium. As it is equilibria we are interested in the result has been stated in its
weaker form.
23
This diculty is a consequence of the dropping of symmetry. To develop a statement that was also
necessary would require excessive complication which would only cloud the result. Even with this simple
condition we can see that there are many distributions that would produce asymmetric outcomes. An
alternative tightening would have been to rule out weakly quasi-convex distributions.
24
Potentially we could also explain such an outcome if we considered a dynamic model in which the
distribution of districts changed from election to election but parties were restricted in changes to their
platforms. The purpose of the result here is to show that such an uneven outcome is also possible in a
single election model with parties completely free to select their platforms.
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Proposition 3 Assume that condition 1 is not satised ( g must be strictly quasi-
concave). Then if an equilibrium exists it is unique and is given by, fI
1
; I
2
g =
f2Z
#
; 2Z
#
g; where Z
#
< 0 and satises g(Z
#
) =
2
3
g(0): Entrants enter and win
districts with median voter's ideal points in the intervals, [Z;Z
#
) and ( Z
#
; Z]: If
g is concave then such an equilibrium always exists.
With condition 1 violated the incumbents have positive incentive to deviate inwards
to win districts in the center o the other incumbent, even though this involves giving
up the extreme districts to entrants. We notice that as compared to the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 the incumbents still have equal shares of expected district wins, but now
neither party will hold a majority. The equilibrium is given by the point where further
inward deviation involves more districts lost on the edges than gained in the center. The
continuity of the pdf g ensures that such a point exists. This is very similar to the
equilibrium when condition 1 was satised. Condition 1 simply ensured that the critical
point was reached before any entry occurred. Therefore, condition 1 can be seen as a
necessary condition for an equilibrium to involve only two parties. Though the districts
abandoned on the edges by the incumbents could be won by a dierent party entering
in each district (eectively independents), we could have as few as two parties entering
and winning arbitrarily close to one half of these districts each. To determine the nal
party structure in this instance we would need to formalize a more extensive model of
entry. As I am primarily concerned with two party outcome structures this issue will not
be explored any further here.
Just like with Proposition 1, the symmetry of g could be relaxed here to produce
an equilibrium involving entry and asymmetric seat shares for the incumbent parties.
Indeed particular g functions could be found to produce any variety of multiple party
equilibria, for example involving entry only on one ank.
This location pair may not constitute an equilibrium for non-concave g functions if
there is too much district share that is lost to entrants. That is, the district share of
the incumbents is so small that they each have incentive to deviate from the prospective
equilibrium to the outside of the other incumbent as they can win a greater share of the
districts on the ank. If g is concave then the density on the anks is small enough such
that these deviations are not protable and so we have an equilibrium.
The result Proposition 2 provides another necessary condition for an equilibrium to
involve only two parties, that the dispersion of Z
0
i
s isn't too wide. This can be expressed
with the following condition.
18
Condition 2 [Z;Z]  [Z

; Z

]:
We can see that Conditions 1 and 2 together form a necessary and sucient condition
for an equilibrium to involve at most two parties. As such, these two conditions can be
interpreted as the limit of Duverger's Law. If both conditions are satised then we
would expect electoral competition amongst no more than two parties and the law to be
satised. If either condition isn't satised then there would be entry and the law would
not apply. This gives the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Under assumptions 1-7, Conditions 1 and 2 are necessary and sucient
conditions for Duverger's Law to hold.
As such, the requirement for cumulative density functions G to satisfy conditions
1 and 2 can be seen as characterizing the domain of Duverger's Law. Outside of this
domain the law would not be expected to hold. This is an appropriate result because
to explain a law such as Duverger's that doesn't hold universally we would expect, and
indeed desire, a theory that predicts a restricted domain of applicability. Hopefully a
recourse to empirics will inform us as to whether this is the correct restriction.
6 Discussion
One thing that we notice when comparing the two batches of results is the discontinuity
in the predictions of the model for both electoral rules. In the single district frame-
work under the run-o rule the model produced a continuum of pure strategy two party
equilibria. With probability one we would have an equilibrium with non-centrist party
platforms. In contrast under the plurality rule the model failed to have an equilibrium
unless we made the somewhat worrisome assumption that the entrant entered even if its
chance of electoral success was zero. However, when we expanded the model to incorpo-
rate multiple districts the predictions of the model under these rules reversed completely.
With even the smallest degree of district heterogeneity the two party equilibria for the
run-o rule no longer existed. At the same time, for the plurality rule we not only guar-
antee an equilibrium exists but produce a unique, non-centrist two party equilibrium.
These discontinuities in prediction are quite startling.
The results of the extended model can also provide some insight into the relationship
between U.S. Congressional elections and Presidential elections. To maximize perfor-
mance in the House elections and to preclude entry of a third party each of the two
incumbent parties must choose a non-centrist platform. However, the Presidential can-
didate of each party competes in only one district, the grand district (with mean zero in
this symmetric framework), and so would like to move towards this center to maximize
his vote in the Presidential race. However, his party is constrained to its non-centrist
platform. So to achieve any centripetal movement a Presidential candidate must try and
detach himself from his party so that he can move towards the center without disrupting
19
the equilibrium for the House elections. One obvious way to achieve this objective would
be on non-policy issues (as they are party platform constrained on policy issues). This
can be seen to lead to the cult of personality phenomena in Presidential races. Per-
sonality traits are one way for a candidate to make himself seem more central without
dragging his party with him. In fact these incentives for detachment from the party base
are applicable to all candidates, including Senators and district candidates, who want
to move towards the median in their given district. It is primarily because Presidential
and Senatorial candidates are more visible that they can achieve this detachment more
eectively than the district candidates. To be pedantic here, the Presidential candidates
would not attempt to move completely to the center as they are really the sole candidate
in a multiple district election with each district representing each state that the candidate
carries. As Hinich and Ordeshook (1974) pointed out, the candidates would attempt to
move to the median of the state that contained the median electoral college vote.
This explanation for the cult of personality campaigns so evident in U.S. elections can
also be used to explain why such campaigns are not as evident in other single member
district elections, such as in Britain and Australia.
25
In those countries the Prime Minister
is elected indirectly by voting for his candidate in your local district. Thus leaders of
the incumbent parties, the Prime Ministerial candidates, maximize their probability of
success by maximizing the number of electorates that their party wins. And this is
achieved by sticking rmly to the non-centrist party platform.
26
We can also use this analysis to consider the phenomena of third party candidates
in Presidential elections. For a wide dispersion of median voter points we have the
prediction that the two incumbent parties are also widely spaced. If the Presidential
candidates cannot achieve detachment from their party platform, or cannot do it very
well, then there will exist a large gap between the positions of the two incumbent party
Presidential candidates. It is potentially this hole that the third party candidates have
tried to exploit. However, the model also predicts that if we have an entry precluding
equilibria then the two incumbents are located no further apart than [2Z

; 2Z

]. And
we know that this isn't wide enough for an entrant to steal the central district, and so
it isn't wide enough for a third candidate to steal the Presidential election. The third
candidate will, however, potentially receive a large share of the votes even though they
have no chance of victory. This prediction is also consistent with history where third
party candidates have received a surprisingly large vote but have never been victorious.
27
This thinking leads to the question of why doesn't one of the incumbent parties enter
25
For a discussion and review of this topic, with particular reference to these three countries, see Crewe
and King (1994).
26
Israel is an interesting example of how direct versus indirect election of the leader of the Government
can have a signicant eect on the political landscape. Electoral changes introduced for the 1996
elections added an additional ballot to the Knesset elections in order to directly elect the Prime Minister.
Previously the Prime Minister had been elected indirectly as in other parliamentary systems. This
apparently innocuous change has had a dramatic impact on Israeli politics. As the Knesset elections
employ proportional representation the results of the model presented here are not directly applicable.
For a full account of the eects of this change on Israel see Arian (1998).
27
Smallwood (1983, p.13).
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a stooge near the other incumbent's platform to break up the oppositions vote and so
ensure victory for themselves? Staying strictly within the framework presented here it
would be hard to answer that they wouldn't. The constraint would be nding a credible
independent candidate, and those that exist would be unlikely to stoop to such behavior
to aid a party that they, by denition of being an independent, have little aliation
with. Consequently, such behavior has been ruled out as unachievable (not to mention
unethical).
Another empirical fact is that district members in the U.S. House express far greater
vote independence than do the equivalent members in, for example, Britain's House of
Commons.
28
It could be conjectured that this greater independence is reective of the
ability of the individual members to detach themselves to some degree from the party
platform. Of course, if complete detachment was possible we would have the centrist
equilibrium result for each district that we had in the single district analysis. Maybe this
extra ability allows the U.S. incumbent parties to support a wider dispersion of median
voter points whilst still precluding entry. It could be that the greater dispersion of median
voters in the U.S. necessitates such exibility if entry is to be precluded. That is, maybe
U.S. dispersion is beyond the bounds specied in our equilibrium and increased exibility
for candidates is what is needed to preclude entry of a third party. Unfortunately, these
are only conjectures, and would need further study for us to be able to comment on them
condently.
A further point which the model predicts that is consistent with the data is that the
dispersion of median points produces some districts that are safely in the hands of one
party, others safely in the hands of the other party, and some districts that are fought for
ercely. This is a direct consequence of the constraint that the parties are constrained
to choose one platform which they must use in every district regardless of its particular
distribution of voters. This result can be seen as a formalization and explanation of what
Robertson (1977) categorized as marginal and safe seats.
7 Empirical Prediction
We have seen that the predictions of the model under the plurality rule are consistent
with the two fundamental empirical phenomena: Duverger's Law and non-centrist plat-
forms. In addition the model requires certain conditions to hold and makes further
predictions as to the actual platform choice of the parties. To test that the structure of
the model presented here is in fact what is underlying the main empirical phenomena
these additional requirements and predictions should be investigated. The model places
restrictions on both the support and the distribution itself of the district median voters.
These restrictions are conditions 2 and 1, respectively. The model also predicts what
the equilibrium party platforms will be for a given distribution of median voters. These
conditions and predictions should, in principle, be empirically testable. We could test
28
Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987, p.43).
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the null hypothesis that the dispersion of median voter points across districts is strictly
contained in the interval bounded by the two incumbent party platforms, and that the
distribution of median voters has sucient density at the edges.
8 Conclusion
By extending the theoretical model of electoral competition with entry to incorporate
simultaneous competition for multiple districts I produce a unique two party equilibrium
under plurality rule with non-centrist party platforms. This equilibrium also precludes
entry of additional parties. This result is used to provide a domain for which Duverger's
Law could be expected to apply. I also investigated the equilibrium characteristics of
the model under the run-o rule and the plurality rule in both the single and multiple
district frameworks. The paper has also shed some light on how the dierent levels of
elections in the U.S. and other systems relate to each other.
9 Appendix
Let tilde (eg.
~
I
1
) denote a deviation by an incumbent.
We note that E will never locate at the same point as either incumbent. At such a
point V
E
= 0 and P (W = E) = 0 by assumption 4. As F is non-degenerate and strictly
increasing such a point is strictly dominated.
For simplicity some arguments of functions have been omitted. This occurs when
they are I
1
; I
2
; or E (these typically represent party positions prior to any deviations).
WOLOG assume that if I
1
6= I
2
then I
1
< I
2
.
9.1 Single District
9.1.1 Plurality: enter no matter what
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2
F (I
1
):
If F (I
1
) 6= 0 then as F is atomless,  small enough can be found s.t.
~
I
1
= I
1
   =)
V
I
1
(
~
I
1
) = F (I
1
 

2
) >
1
2
F (I
1
) and so I
1
is better o.
22
If F (I
1
) = 0 then as F is non-degenerate a  small enough can be found s.t. 0 <
F (I
2
+) <
1
2
: Then
~
I
2
= I
2
+ =) C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
) = I
+
2
and V
I
2
(
~
I
2
) = F (
~
I
2
) F (
I
1
+
~
I
2
2
) > 0;
as F is strictly increasing once F > 0: No equilibrium.
 I
1
6= I
2:
Then C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
) = I
+
2
and P (W = EjE 2 C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
)) = 1:
For I
1
; P (W = I
1
) = 0; V
I
1
= F (
I
1
+I
2
2
):
If F (I
2
) 6= 0 then as F is atomless there exists an  small enough such that
~
I
1
=
I
2
   =) V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) > V
I
1
: If F (I
2
) = 0 then consider the same deviation as in the
subcase above.
 I
1
= I
2
= 0:
Then C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
) = fI
 
1
; I
+
2
g and P (W = EjE 2 C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
)) = 1:
For I
1
; P (W = I
1
) = 0 and V
I
1
!
1
4
as "! 0:
~
I
1
= I
1
  ;  > 0 =) V
I
1
(
~
I
1
) = F (
 
2
) >
1
4
for  small enough. No equilibrium.
There is no equilibrium when I
1
; I
2
 0, and so by symmetry when I
1
; I
2
 0:
Therefore any equilibrium must involve the two incumbents locating on opposite sides of
the median voter.
Dene y where 1  2F (
y
2
) = F (y) and Y = (y; y):
Case 2 I
1
; I
2
=2 Y [ fy; yg: (So I
1
< y; I
2
>  y)
 jI
1
j 6= jI
2
j :
Let jI
1
j < jI
2
j : i.e. I
1
is closer to the center.
If E = 0; V
E
= F (
I
2
2
)  F (
I
1
2
) > F (
 y
2
)  F (
y
2
) = 1  2F (
y
2
)
If E = I
+
2
; V
E
! 1  F (I
2
) < 1  F ( y) = F (y) =) P (W = EjE 2 C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
)) = 0:
If E = I
 
1
; V
E
! F (I
1
) < F (y)) P (W = EjE 2 C
"
E
(I
1
; I
2
)) = 0 as F (y) <
1
3
:
So for " small enough, I
 
1
; I
+
2
=2 C
"
E
: i.e. E locates in the center.
To optimize E will choose a point x s.t. V
I
1
= V
I
2
: If such a point does not exist then
E 2 I
+
1
with E ! I
1
as " ! 0: This is optimal as if V
I
1
> V
I
2
then V
E
will increase if
the entrant deviates to
~
E = E   ; where  > 0 and V
I
1
(I
1
; I
2
;
~
E) > V
I
2
(I
1
; I
2
;
~
E): So E
continues to deviate until V
I
1
= V
I
2
; or E ! I
+
1
:
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- Assume E = x s.t. V
1
1
= V
I
2
:
Then consider
~
I
2
=  I
1
; C
"
E
= 0
 +
, as I
1
;
~
I
2
=2 Y [ fy; yg; and V
I
1
= V
~
I
2
: As
[I
1
;
~
I
2
]  [I
1
; I
2
] =) V
E
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) < V
E
(I
1
; I
2
) and so V
I
2
(
~
I
2
) > V
I
2
: As no other candidate's
vote share increased relative to that of I
2
's then P (W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
)  P (W = I
2
) and I
2
will deviate. No equilibrium.
- Assume E 2 I
+
1
and V
I
1
> V
I
2
; so P (W = I
2
) = 0:
Consider
~
I
2
=  I
1
: Then again C
"
E
= 0
 +
; V
E
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) < V
E
(I
1
; I
2
) and V
I
1
= V
I
2
(
~
I
2
):
Thus, V
I
2
(
~
I
2
) > V
I
2
: So I
2
is better o. No equilibrium.
 jI
1
j = jI
2
j :
Then C
"
E
= 0
 +
and V
I
1
= V
I
2
:
Consider,
~
I
1
= I
1
+ ; where  is small such that
~
I
1
< y; i.e.  <


I
1
2


:
Then E will still choose a point such that V
I
1
(
~
I
1
) = V
I
2
:
As [
~
I
1
; I
2
]  [I
1
; I
2
]; V
E
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) < V
E
(I
1
; I
2
):
And so V
I
1
(
~
I
1
) > V
I
1
and P (W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
)  P (W = I
1
j I
1
; I
2
):
So I
1
will deviate. No equilibrium.
Case 3 I
1
; I
2
2 Y:
If E 2 (I
1
; I
2
) then V
E
< 1  2F
 
y
2

) P (W = E) = 0:
If E = I
+
2
then V
E
> 1  F ( y) = F (y) :
If E = I
 
1
then V
E
> F (y) : So E will locate on a ank.
We note that if jI
1
j = jI
2
j then C
"
E
= fI
 
1
; I
+
2
g; P (W = E) = 0; and P (W =
I
1
) = P (W = I
2
) =
1
2
: So if for I
1
; I
2
; P (W = E) > 0 then either P (W = I
1
) <
1
2
or
P (W = I
2
) <
1
2
: If P (W = I
1
) <
1
2
then
~
I
1
=  I
2
=) P (W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
) =
1
2
: So this
can't be an equilibrium. Likewise for P (W = I
2
) <
1
2
:
So in an equilibrium E must be solely vote maximizing (as it can't win the election).
 jI
1
j < jI
2
j :
For small enough "; C
"
E
= I
 
1
:V
E
> F (y) =) V
I
1
< 1  2F
 
y
2

< V
E
: And as we only
need consider P (W = E) = 0 then P (W = I
2
) = 1; P (W = I
1
) = 0:
So
~
I
1
=  I
2
and P (W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
) =
1
2
=) I
1
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
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 jI
1
j = jI
2
j :
C
"
E
=

I
 
1
; I
+
2
	
: Consider
~
I
1
= I
1
  ; where  < 2I
1
;
~
I
1
 y:
Then C
"
E
= I
+
2
=) V
I
1

~
I
1
; I
2
; E

> V
E

~
I
1
; I
2
; E

and V
I
1

~
I
1
; I
2
; E

> V
I
2

~
I
1
; I
2
; E

:
So P

W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E

= 1: No equilibrium.
Case 4 I
1
2 Y; I
2
=2 Y: (So I
1
2 (y; 0) ; I
2
>  y) :
E = I
+
2
is dominated by E = I
 
1
: So I
+
2
=2 C
"
E
:
V
I
2
is bounded by F
 
I
1
+I
2
2

(when E = I
 
1
).
Consider
~
I
2
=  I
1
+ ; where  is small (0 >
 
2
> I
1
such that
~
I
2
2 Y ). For small
enough "; C
"
E
= I
 
1
: So V
E

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

= F (I
1
) > V
I
1

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

:
V
I
2

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

= 1   F
 

2

> F (I
1
) : So P

W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

= 1 and vote share
has increased.
Therefore, regardless of P (W = I
2
j I
1
; I
2
; E) ; I
2
has incentive to deviate. No equi-
librium.
Case 5 I
1
= y: Need to show that I
2
=  y is a strict best response.
If I
2
=  y =) P (W = I
2
) =
1
2
:
Consider
~
I
2
<  y: For
~
I
2
 0 we know that P

W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

= 0: I
2
is strictly
worse o. So consider
~
I
2
2 (0; y): Then E =
~
I
+
2
and P

W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

= 0: I
2
is
strictly worse o.
Consider
~
I
2
>  y: For small enough "; I
 
1
;
~
I
+
2
=2 C
"
E
: E optimizes with a point s.t.
- V
I
1

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

= V
I
2

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

:
In this case we must have P (W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E) 
1
2
: As [I
1
; I
2
] 
h
I
1
;
~
I
2
i
then
V
E

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

> V
E
(I
1
; I
2
; E) ; so V
I
2

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

< V
I
2
(I
1
; I
2
; E) and P (W = I
2
j
I
1
; I
2
; E)  P (W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E):
Therefore I
2
is strictly worse o.
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- V
I
1

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

> V
I
2

I
1
;
~
I
2
; E

:
P (W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E) = 0: I
2
is strictly worse o.
So I
2
=  y is I
2
's strict best response to I
1
= y:
Thus fy; yg is an equilibrium, and the only equilibrium involving I
1
= y or I
2
=  y:
9.1.2 Plurality: Enter only if have a positive probability of victory
Case 1 I
1
; I
2
 0:
The entrant always wins in this case. So the proof is the same as for the `enter no
matter what' result.
Dene !; where 1  2F (
!
2
) = F (
!
2
): That is F (
!
2
) =
1
3
: And set 
 = (!; !) with
^


being the closure of 
:
Case 2 I
1
; I
2
2 
= f0g :
Note that if
~
I
2
=  I
1
then E =  and P (W = I
1
j I
1
;
~
I
2
) = P (W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
) =
1
2
:
So in equilibrium P (W = I
j
) 
1
2
for j = 1; 2: Therefore P (W = E j I
1;
I
2
) = 0 and
so E = :
 jI
1
j > jI
2
j :
Then P (W = I
2
) = 1 for E = : Can't be an equilibrium.
 I
1
=  I
2
:
Consider
~
I
1
= I
1
+; where  2 (0;
2
3
jI
1
j): E 2 (
~
I
1
; I
2
) still gives P (W = E j
~
I
1;
I
2
) = 0:
So E =2 (
~
I
1
; I
2
):
For E =
~
I
 
1
; V
E
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) is bounded by F (
~
I
1
): And F (
~
I
1
) < 1   F (
~
I
1
+I
2
2
) =
V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E): So E =2
~
I
 
1
: Likewise for E = I
+
2
: Therefore E = : So we must have
V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) > V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) and P (W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = 1: I
1
is strictly better o. No
equilibrium.
Case 3 I
1
; I
2
=2
^

:
The entrant always wins in this case (e.g. by locating at 0). So the proof is the same
as the analogous case under the `enter no matter what' assumption.
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Case 4 I
1
2
^

=f0g; I
2
=2
^

:
If E = ; then P (W = I
1
) = 1: And
~
I
2
=  I
1
=) P (W = I
1
j I
1
;
~
I
2
) = P (W = I
2
j
I
1
;
~
I
2
) =
1
2
, making I
2
better o.
So for this to be an equilibrium E must enter. Therefore P (W = E) > 0 and
P (W = I
2
) 
1
2
must hold in equilibrium.
This requires P (W = I
1
) = 0. So we must have V
E
= V
I
2
> V
I
1
:
- Assume E 2 (I
1
; I
2
):
Let E = t be the point at which V
E
= V
I
2
> V
I
1
holds. By the continuity of F this
point is unique. Then, also by the continuity of F and that V
I
2
> V
I
1
, there exists a small
enough  such that
~
E = t +  =) V
E
> V
I
2
> V
E
1
and so P (W = E j I
1
; I
2
;
~
E) = 1:
Therefore E is strictly better o and so can't be optimizing by playing E = t: No
equilibrium.
- Assume E 2 C
"
E
= I
 
1
:
If for "
0
; V
E
= V
I
2
then by the continuity of F , there must exist a point r, where
r < I
1
, such that E = r =) V
E
= V
I
2
: For small enough " I
 
1
 (r; I
1
) and so V
E
>
V
I
2
=) P (W = I
2
) = 0: So for E in this interval there cannot be a tie between E and
I
2
: No equilibrium.
- Assume E 2 C
"
E
= I
+
2
:
Then V
I
1
>
1
2
and so P (W = I
1
) = 1: No equilibrium.
Case 5 I
1
= !; I
2
2
^

:
- Assume I
2
=  !.
Then E = 0 and P (W = I
1
j I
1
; I
2
; E) = P (W = I
2
j I
1
; I
2
; E) = P (W = E j
I
1
; I
2
; E) =
1
3
:
Consider
~
I
1
= ! + ; where  2 (0;
2
3
jwj): E 2 (
~
I
1
; I
2
) gives P (W = E j
~
I
1;
I
2
; E) = 0:
So E =2 (
~
I
1
; I
2
):
For E =
~
I
 
1
; V
E
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) is bounded by F (
~
I
1
): And F (
~
I
1
) < 1   F (
~
I
1
+I
2
2
) =
V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E): So E =2
~
I
 
1
: Likewise for E = I
+
2
: Therefore E = : And so we must
have V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) > V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) and P (W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = 1: I
1
is strictly better o.
No equilibrium.
- Assume I
2
2 (0; !):
Note that
~
I
1
=  I
2
=) E =  and P (W = I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = P (W = I
2
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) =
1
2
:
And
~
I
2
=  I
1
=) E = 0 and P (W = I
1
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E) = P (W = I
2
j I
1
;
~
I
2
; E) = P (W =
E j I
1
; I
2
; E) =
1
3
: So in equilibrium P (W = I
1
) 
1
2
and P (W = I
2
) 
1
3
: So E = : But
then P (W = I
2
) = 1 and P (W = I
1
) = 0: No equilibrium.
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9.1.3 Run-O: enter no matter what
Firstly I shall prove a lemma which is valid for both assumptions on entry. Vote share
refers to primary vote share.
Lemma 1 If jI
1
j < jI
2
j then if E is (almost) maximizing P (W = I
2
) = 0: That is, the
incumbent furthest from the center never wins.
Proof. If E =  then we have two candidate plurality and as jI
1
j < jI
2
j then
P (W = I
1
) = 1 and so P (W = I
2
) = 0: So consider E 6= : If E 2 I
+
2
then V
I
1
>
1
2
and
so P (W = I
1
) = 1: But V
E
(E 2 I
 
1
) > V
E
(E 2 I
+
2
) and so E =2 I
+
2
: So if P (W = E) = 0
then to maximize vote share E 2 fI
 
1
; (I
1
; I
2
)g; in which case jEj < jI
2
j which implies
P (W = I
2
) = 0 (as no matter who I
2
faces in the run-o it will lose). So if P (W = I
2
) > 0
we must have P (W = E) > 0: For both of these conditions to hold we must have jEj = jI
2
j
and V
I
1
 V
I
2
; V
E
. So E =  I
2
: But if such a point exists then by the continuity of F
there exists another point that makes E strictly better o and so this original point can't
constitute an optimizer for E. Consider
~
E =
E+I
1
2
; then V
E
(I
1
; I
2
;
~
E) > V
I
1
(I
1
; I
2
;
~
E) and



~
E



< jI
2
j so P (W = Ej
~
E) = 1: So there doesn't exist an almost maximizing location in
which P (W = I
2
) > 0 and P (W = E) > 0: And as P (W = E) = 0 =) P (W = I
2
) = 0
then if E is almost optimizing P (W = I
2
) = 0:
Dene W
0
= [W

; W

]; where W

solves F (W

) = 1  2F (
W

2
):
Case 1 I
1
; I
2
2 W
0
:
Consider symmetric locations, jI
1
j = jI
2
j : If E 2 (I
1
; I
2
) then V
E
< 1   2F (
W

2
)
and V
I
1
; V
I
2
> F (W

); which imply that E loses in the rst round. If E 2 I
 
1
; I
+
2
then
jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j and so E will never win the run-o. So P (W = E) = 0: If x 6= W

then
C
"
E
= fI
 
1
; I
+
2
g: If x = W

and F isn't uniform then C
"
E
= fI
 
1
; I
+
2
; 0
 +
g: If x = W

and F is uniform then C
"
E
= fI
 
1
; I
+
2
; (I
1
; I
2
)g: In all circumstances the incumbents are
aected equally and we have P (W = I
1
) = P (W = I
2
) =
1
2
:
So any equilibrium in this range must satisfy P (W = I
1
) 
1
2
; P (W = I
2
) 
1
2
; as
either incumbent could deviate to symmetry.
Consider deviations from symmetry. If an incumbent deviates outwards then by
Lemma 1 their probability of victory is zero and they are strictly worse o. Now consider
a deviation inwards, let
~
I
1
2 (I
1
; 0]: E =
~
I
 
1
then implies V
~
I
1
< 1 2F (
W

2
) as E; I
2
2 W
0
:
As V
E
= F (
~
I
1
) > F (W

) and V
I
2
= 1   F (
~
I
1
+I
2
2
) > F (W

) then V
E
; V
I
2
> V
~
I
1
and so
P (W =
~
I
1
) = 0 and I
1
is strictly worse o (we also note that as for small enough ";
jEj < jI
2
j then P (W = Ej
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = 1). Thus, fI
1
; I
2
g = fy; yg where y 2 W
0
is a
strict Nash equilibrium.
Now consider asymmetric positions, say jI
1
j < jI
2
j : From the lemma if E is almost
maximizing P (W = I
2
) = 0: So this can't be an equilibrium as
~
I
2
=  I
1
=) P (W =
I
1
) =
1
2
: No asymmetric equilibria.
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Case 2 I
1
2 W
0
; I
2
=2 W
0
:
This implies that jI
2
j > jI
1
j ; and so P (W = I
2
) = 0: If
~
I
2
=  I
1
then I
1
;
~
I
2
2 W
0
and
so, by Case 1, P (W = I
2
) =
1
2
: So I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
Dene W = [F
 1
(
1
4
); F
 1
(
3
4
)]:
Case 3 I
1
; I
2
=2 W:
This case provides examples of situations where an entrant does not maximize its
utility my maximizing its primary vote share.
 If I
1
; I
2
< F
 1
(
1
4
):
We notice that E 2 I
+
2
=) P (W = E) = 1: The proof that this cannot constitute an
equilibrium uses the same deviations and analysis as for Case 1 from `Plurality: enter no
matter what' (of course we only need consider the rst two subcases from that proof).
 I
1
< F
 1
(
1
4
); I
2
> F
 1
(
3
4
):
E can win the election. E = F
 1
(
1
4
) =) V
I
1
= F [
I
1
+F
 1
(
1
4
)
2
] <
1
4
and V
E
=
F [
I
2
+F
 1
(
1
4
)
2
]   F [
I
1
+F
 1
(
1
4
)
2
] >
1
4
: And so E isn't eliminated in the rst round. Then
as jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j E will win the run-o against whoever survives. So P (W = E) = 1:
There exists many points whereby E wins. We have to establish which point (ap-
proximately) maximizes its primary vote share, and so where it will locate.
Let jI
1
j  jI
2
j : Using the arguments of Case 2 from `Plurality: enter no matter what'
we can say the E will maximize its vote share by approaching I
1
until V
I
1
= V
I
2
; if such
a point exists, else E 2 I
+
1
and V
I
1
> V
I
2
: In the latter case V
I
1
<
1
4
and V
E
>
1
4
;
so P (W = E) = 1: And we have C
"
E
= I
+
1
: If E is chosen such that V
I
1
= V
I
2
; and
V
I
1
= V
I
2
<
1
3
then P (W = E) = 1 and so this is optimal for E. If V
I
1
= V
I
2

1
3
then
P (W = E) 
1
3
and so this isn't optimal for E: E must move towards an incumbent.
Recall that if E locates at any point between the incumbents then it wins an interval of
voters of constant length. Its choice of location is eectively a choice of where this interval
should be placed on (I
1
; I
2
). As E is moving towards an incumbent he is losing vote share
and so wants to move as little as possible. Noting that at E = F
 1
(
1
4
); V
E
> V
I
1
; then
by the continuity of F a point, call it K, will exist such that E = K =) V
I
1
= V
E
: This
corresponds to a selection of location for the interval of voters that E wins. If E were to
reect this interval about zero then by the symmetry of f we would have V
I
2
= V
E
: Let
the location of E that corresponds to this location of its interval be denoted K; and by
the symmetry of f such a point exists. Note that for jI
1
j 6= jI
2
j we will have K 6=  K:
As for E 2 K
 
; K
+
we have jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j then C
"
E
= fK
 
; K
+
g:
Now we know how E will react we can consider possible deviations for the incumbents.
It suces to consider only vote share with these deviations as prior to deviation P (W =
I
1
) = P (W = I
2
) = 0:
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 Assume jI
1
j < jI
2
j
Consider
~
I
2
=  I
1
. After this deviation E will maximize vote share by locating at
zero. With this deviation in mind consider the original subcases,
- Previously E was chosen such that V
I
1
> V
I
2
(i.e. E 2 I
+
1
):
If E = 0 =) V
I
1
= V
I
2
<
1
3
then C
"
E
= 0
 +
: As (I
1
;
~
I
2
)  (I
1
; I
2
) then V
E
(I
1;
~
I
2
) < V
E
;
and so V
I
2
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) > V
I
2
: I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
If E = 0 =) V
I
1
= V
I
2

1
3
then E will move towards an incumbent, and its vote
share will be even less than if it had located at zero (though now it will win the election).
So V
I
1
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) + V
I
2
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) > V
I
1
+ V
I
2
; and as the entrant will attack both incumbents
equally we have E[V
I
1
(I
1
;
~
I
2
)] = E[V
I
2
(I
1
;
~
I
2
)]; which implies that E[V
I
2
(I
1
;
~
I
2
)] > V
I
2
(where the expectation is because E is randomizing over two distinct intervals): I
2
is
strictly better o. No equilibrium.
- Previously C
"
E
= x
 +
and V
I
1
= V
I
2
at E = x (not just equal in expectation).
If E = 0 =) V
I
1
= V
I
2
<
1
3
then C
"
E
= 0
 +
: As above, I
2
s then strictly better o.
No equilibrium.
If E = 0 =) V
I
1
= V
I
2

1
3
then E will move towards an incumbent and, as above,
I
2
will be strictly better o. No equilibrium.
- Previously C
"
E
= fK
 
; K
+
g so that V
I
1
= V
I
2
only in expectation (i.e. E attacked one
incumbent).
Thus E = 0 =) V
I
1
= V
I
2

1
3
and so C
"
E
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) = fK
 

; K
+

g: As (I
1
;
~
I
2
) 
(I
1
; I
2
) then V
E
(I
1;
~
I
2
) < V
E
: As in expectation we still have V
I
1
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) = V
I
2
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) then
E[V
I
2
(I
1
;
~
I
2
)] > E[V
I
2
]: So I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
 Assume jI
1
j = jI
2
j
Now it must be the case that V
I
1
= V
I
2
. This can result from C
"
E
= 0
 +
or C
"
E
=
fK
 
; K
+
g; but not C
"
E
= I
 
1
or C
"
E
= I
+
2
:
- C
"
E
= 0
 +
implies that V
I
1
= V
I
2
<
1
3
:
Then there exists a  small enough such that
~
I
2
= I
2
   whereby C
"
E
= (

2
)
 +
and
V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) = V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) <
1
3
. And so this is the optimal choice for E: As (I
1
;
~
I
2
)  (I
1
; I
2
)
then V
E
(I
1;
~
I
2
) < V
E
: This implies that V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) > V
I
2
: And so I
2
is strictly better o.
No equilibrium.
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- C
"
E
= fK
 
; K
+
g. This implies that E[V
I
1
] = E[V
I
2
] 
1
3
:
If
~
I
2
= I
2
   such that
~
I
2
=2 W then as (I
1
;
~
I
2
)  (I
1
; I
2
) we have for small enough 
that E =

2
=) V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) = V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) 
1
3
: So E will again optimize by moving towards
one of the incumbents. Also because (I
1
;
~
I
2
)  (I
1
; I
2
) we have V
E
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) < V
E
and so as
E[V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
)] = E[V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
)] then E[V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
)] > E[V
I
2
]: Thus I
2
is strictly better o.
No equilibrium.
Case 4 I
1
; I
2
2 W=W
0
:
Note that the region W=W
0
may be empty. For example if f is uniform on [ 
1
2
;
1
2
];
this implies that W = W
0
:
I need to show that if the condition on y isn't satised, or the incumbents aren't
located symmetrically then they can't be in equilibrium.
 Firstly consider I
1
; I
2
< W

:
The proof that this cannot constitute an equilibrium uses the same deviations and
analysis as for Case 1 from `Plurality: enter no matter what'. No equilibrium.
 Secondly consider when the incumbents are symmetric but the condition isn't sat-
ised. That is I
2
=  I
1
and F (
I
1
2
) <
1
3
:
Then E = 0 =) V
I
1
; V
I
2
<
1
3
; V
E
>
1
3
; and as jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j E wins the run-o.
P (W = E) = 1: Consider
~
I
1
= I
1
+  such that F (
~
I
1
2
) <
1
3
: Then E =  

2
=) P (W =
E) = 1 but V
E
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) < V
E
and so V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) > V
I
1
: Thus I
1
is strictly better o. No
equilibrium.
 Now consider asymmetric locations where the condition isn't satised.
For I
1
< W

; I
2
>  W

let jI
1
j = jI
2
j   ; where  > 0: From Lemma 1 we have
in equilibrium P (W = I
2
) = 0: To maximize vote E 2 (I
1
; I
2
): If
~
I
2
=  I
1
then E
maximizes his vote and wins the election at E 2 0
 +
: But as (I
1
;
~
I
2
)  (I
1
; I
2
) then
V
E
(I
1;
~
I
2
) < V
E
: This implies that V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) > V
I
2
: And so I
2
is strictly better o. No
equilibrium.
 Finally, consider asymmetric locations when the condition is satised.
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Once again let jI
1
j = jI
2
j ; where  > 0; and so P (W = I
2
) = 0: Let
~
I
2
=  I
1
: For
E to win C
"
E
= fK
 
; K
+
g; where K
 
and K
+
are as dened above. This is because if
E locates on the anks then jEj > jI
1
j ; jI
2
j so E couldn't win the run-o. If such points
don't exist then E maximizes its vote at E = 0, by denition ofW

; and this implies that
P (W = I
1
jI
1
;
~
I
2
) = P (W = I
2
jI
1
;
~
I
2
) =
1
2
: So I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
So assume that such points exist. At E 2 K
 
we have V
E
(I
1
;
~
I
2
) > V
I
1
(I
1
;
~
I
2
): Now
consider the original decision of E before any deviations (being careful to distinguish
between variables in terms of I
2
and
~
I
2
). If E 2 I
 
1
then V
E
< V
I
1
(I
1
;
~
I
2
): And if
E 2 K
 
then V
E
> V
E
(I
1
;
~
I
2
): This implies that V
E
(E = K
 
) > V
E
(E = I
 
1
): And as
E 2 K
 
=) P (W = E) = 1; then I
 
1
=2 C
"
E
: So both before and after I
2
deviates inwards
the entrant locates between the incumbents and attacks one of them in the rst round.
As (I
1
;
~
I
2
)  (I
1
; I
2
) then V
E
(I
1;
~
I
2
) < V
E
: This implies that E[V
I
2
(
~
I
1
; I
2
)] > E[V
I
2
]: And
so I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
Case 5 I
1
=2 W; I
2
2 W=W
0
:
 If I
1
; I
2
< 0 then E = I
+
2
=) V
E
>
1
2
and P (W = E) = 1: As f is atomless there
exists a  small enough such that
~
I
1
= I
2
   implies V
I
1
(
~
I
1
; I
2
) > V
I
1
: So I
1
is
strictly better o. No equilibrium.
 Let I
1
< F
 1
(
1
4
); I
2
2 (W

; F
 1
(
3
4
)]: So P (W = I
1
) = 0: Consider
~
I
1
=  I
2
and
repeat the analysis of case 4 above. No equilibrium.
9.1.4 Run-O: Enter only if have a positive probability of victory
Case 1 I
1
; I
2
2 W
0
:
Consider symmetric locations. Then P (W = E) = 0 which implies E =  and
P (W = I
1
) = P (W = I
2
) =
1
2
: So to have an equilibrium in this domain we must have
P (W = I
1
); P (W = I
2
) 
1
2
:
For inwards deviations, say
~
I
1
= I
1
+ ;  > 0; then from `Run-o: enter no mat-
ter what' Case 1 we know that this implies P (W = Ej
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = 1 =) P (W =
~
I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = 0 and so I
1
is strictly worse o and wouldn't deviate. Considering devia-
tions outwards then from lemma 1 we have P (W =
~
I
1
j
~
I
1
; I
2
; E) = 0 and so I
1
is strictly
worse o. Thus, fI
1
; I
2
g = fy; yg where y 2 W
0
is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Consider asymmetric locations, jI
1
j < jI
2
j : By lemma 1 P (W = I
2
) = 0: So I
2
could
deviate to
~
I
2
=  I
1
and be strictly better o. No equilibrium.
Case 2 I
1
2 W
0
; I
2
=2 W
0
:
By lemma 1 P (W = I
2
) = 0: So I
2
could deviate to
~
I
2
=  I
1
and be strictly better
o. No equilibrium.
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Case 3 I
1
; I
2
=2 W:
In Case 3 of `Run-o: enter no matter what' E 6=  both before and after the
deviations considered. As such, the proof of Case 3 here is identical to that above. No
equilibrium.
Case 4 I
1
; I
2
2 W=W
0
:
Repeat Case 4 from `Run-o: enter no matter what' with the following additions. If
the deviations mentioned cause the entrant to alter its strategy to E =  (which wasn't
allowed in `enter no matter what') then the vote share of the incumbents must be as least
as great as it was when the entrant had to enter the market. As the deviating incumbent's
vote share went up in that case, then it must also go up when the entrant chooses to not
enter. As for all deviators considered in the previous proof the probability of victory was
originally zero then the increased vote share alone implies that the deviator is strictly
better o. No equilibrium.
So consider when E =  before any deviation. If the condition F (
y
2
) 
1
3
isn't
satised then E = 0 =) P (W = E) = 1; so E 6= , a contradiction: So we need
only consider asymmetric incumbent locations when the condition of the equilibrium is
satised (remember symmetric locations may in fact constitute an equilibrium). Let
jI
1
j < jI
2
j : Then P (W = I
2
) = 0, from lemma 1: This implies that E 2 (I
1
; I
2
) =) V
E
<
V
I
1
; V
I
2
(as otherwise E would enter): If
~
I
2
=  I
1
then E still can't win by locating in
the center, and as the incumbent's are symmetric E can't win on the anks, so again
E = : But now P (W = I
2
jI
1
;
~
I
2
) =
1
2
: So I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
Case 5 I
1
=2 W; I
2
2 W=W
0
:
Proceed as in Case 5 from `run-o: enter no matter what', with the same additional
remarks as in Case 4 of this proof. No equilibrium.
9.2 Multiple Districts
9.2.1 Proposition 1
First I shall prove a lemma. Dene Z
0
= [2Z

; 2Z

]:
Lemma 2 For I
1
; I
2
2 Z
0
and I
1
 I
2
the districts won by both incumbents combined
are D = [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+3I
2
4
]:
Proof. Note that all of these districts may not actually exist for a given G (i.e.
existence requires g(:) > 0). This lemma is proven by showing that successful entry is
not possible in these districts, and only these districts.
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Consider entry between the incumbents. In a given district E can secure an interval
of voters of length (
I
2
 I
1
2
) for itself. Ignoring for the moment the location of I
1
and
I
2
, to maximize vote share with a given length interval on a symmetric, single peaked
distribution, such as F , it is weakly optimal to center the interval about the peak, the
median voter.
As I
1
; I
2
2 Z
0
then I
2
  I
1
 4Z

=) (
I
2
 I
1
2
)  2Z

: From the denition of Z

we
have V
E

1
3
: As for a xed E; V
I
1
and V
I
2
are strictly monotone functions in z
r
(the
district median voter; as I
1
; I
2
2 Z
0
) then only on a set of measure zero (that is, at one
point) can V
I
1
= V
I
2
= V
E
=
1
3
and P (W = E) 6= 0: Thus E can't win in any measurable
set of districts by locating between I
1
and I
2
.
Consider now entry on a ank. Let district l have median z
l
=
3I
1
+I
2
4
  ; where
 2 [
I
1
 I
2
4
;1):
Let E = I
 
1
; then V
E
(l) is bounded by F (I
1
  z
l
) as " ! 0 (where V
E
(l) is E's vote
share in district l). This is the case as for the given range of  E = I
+
2
is dominated by
E = I
 
1
(as I
1
is closer to the median in these districts).
V
E
(l) < F (I
1
 
3I
1
+I
2
4
+ ) = F (
I
1
 I
2
4
+ ):V
I
2
(l) = 1 F (
I
2
 I
1
4
+ ): As F is symmetric
F (
I
1
 I
2
4
) = 1  F (
I
2
 I
1
4
):
As F is a cdf then for   0; z
l
2 D;F (
I
1
 I
2
4
+)  1 F (
I
2
 I
1
4
+) =) V
E
(l) < V
I
2
(l)
and so P (W = E) = 0:
For  > 0; z
l
=2 D;F (
I
1
 I
2
4
+ ) > 1  F (
I
2
 I
1
4
+ ) =) V
E
(l) > V
I
2
(l): Also, as "! 0;
V
I
1
(l)! F (
I
2
 I
1
4
+) F (
I
1
 I
2
4
+) < F (
I
2
 I
1
4
) F (
I
1
 I
2
4
) = 1 F (
I
1
 I
2
4
) F (
I
1
 I
2
4
) 
1
3
:
So for small enough " V
I
1
(l) <
1
3
and then P (W = I
1
) = 0: Therefore for  > 0 P (W =
E) = 1:
So the incumbents win districts for   0 and lose districts when  > 0: Thus, as F
is symmetrical they win only districts in D:
It is obvious that I
1
wins [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
] and I
2
wins [
I
1
+I
2
2
;
3I
1
+I
2
4
]; with a tie in the
middle district. Call these intervals D(I
1
) and D(I
2
), respectively.
Dene D(I
1
) = D(I
1
)\ [Z;Z]; and likewise for D(I
2
_
). These are the districts won by
each incumbent that actually exist.
Dene M(I
1
) =
R
D(I
1
)
g(z)dz; and likewise for M(I
2
): These are the shares of the
districts won by each incumbent.
Dene H = (2Z; 2Z); and
^
H = closure(H):
Case 1 I
1
; I
2
2 H:
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If D(I
1
) =  then,
If I
2
6= 0 set
~
I
1
=  I
2
: This implies D(I
1
) = [
3I
1
+I
2
2
; 0] and so M(
~
I
1
) > 0: No
equilibrium. Likewise for D(I
2
):
If I
2
= 0 set
~
I
1
= Z: This implies D(I
1
) = [
3Z
4
;
Z
2
] and so M(
~
I
1
) > 0: No equilibrium.
So in equilibrium both M(I
1
);M(I
2
) > 0:
Therefore we must have
I
1
+I
2
2
2 (Z;Z):
If
3I
1
+I
2
4
< Z then set
~
I
1
= I
1
+ ; where  is s.t.
3
~
I
1
+I
2
4
= Z:
We haveD(I
1
) = [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
] =) D(I
1
) = [Z;
I
1
+I
2
2
]: NowD(
~
I
1
) = [
3
~
I
1
+I
2
4
;
~
I
1
+I
2
2
] =)
D(I
1
) = [Z;
~
I
1
+I
2
2
] = [Z;
I
1
+I
2
2
+

2
]:
And so D(I
1
)  D(
~
I
1
); making I
1
strictly better o. No equilibrium. Likewise for
I
1
+3I
2
4
> Z:
So for an equilibrium we must have that [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+3I
2
4
] = D  [Z;Z]: Though
3I
1
+I
2
4
6=
Z as this implies that I
1
 2Z; but then I
1
=2 H: Likewise for
I
1
+3I
2
4
6= Z: So D  [Z;Z]:
Now, assuming jI
1
j  jI
2
j ; consider a deviation
~
I
1
= I
1
  ; where  > 0 and such
that
~
I
1
2 H:
D(I
1
) = D(I
1
) = [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
]: And D(
~
I
1
) = D(
~
I
1
) = [
3
~
I
1
+I
2
4
;
~
I
1
+I
2
2
] = [
3I
1
+I
2
4
 
3
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
 

2
]:
And so we get the relationship, D(
~
I
1
) = D(I
1
)  [
I
1
+I
2
2
 

2
;
I
1
+I
2
2
]+[
3I
1
+I
2
4
 
3
4
;
3I
1
+I
2
4
]:
If g is strictly quasi-concave then by condition 1 we see that M(
~
I
1
) > M(I
1
):
If g is quasi-convex then as for small enough ;
3I
1
+I
2
4
<
I
1
+I
2
2
 

2
< 0; then M(
~
I
1
) >
M(I
1
) (as there is more density at the extremes). No equilibrium.
Case 2 I
1
; I
2
2 Z
0
=
^
H: Note that for Z = Z

this set is empty.
 I
1
; I
2
< 2Z: Then E = I
+
2
wins all districts, M(I
1
) =M(I
2
) = 0:
Consider
~
I
2
=  I
1
: D(I
2
) = [0;
~
I
2
2
] =) D(I
2
) = [0; Z] as I
1
< 2Z. This implies
M(I
2
) > 0:
I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
 I
1
< 2Z; I
2
>  2Z: Let jI
1
j  jI
2
j :
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D(I
1
) = [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
] =) D(I
1
) = [Z;
I
1
+I
2
2
]: Consider a deviation,
~
I
1
= I
1
+; where
 is s.t.
~
I
1
< 2Z:
D(
~
I
1
) = [
3
~
I
1
+I
2
4
;
~
I
1
+I
2
2
] = [
3I
1
+I
2
4
+
3
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
+

2
] =) D(
~
I
1
) = [Z;
I
1
+I
2
2
+

2
]: As
[
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
1
+I
2
2
+

2
] is measurable we have M(
~
I
1
) > M(I
1
): No equilibrium.
Case 3 I
1
2 Z
0
; I
2
=2 Z
0
:
I will use the D notation from lemma 2, though calling it D
0
here because I
2
=2 Z
0
means the lemma may not be applicable. What can be seen is that some of the arguments
from the lemma can be preserved. Entry on the ank is still precluded but there may be
entry in the center. So we see that D(I
1
)  D
0
(I
1
) and D(I
2
)  D
0
(I
2
): That is, the set
of districts that would be won (if they existed) is a subset of D
0
:
WOLOG let I
1
 0: If I
2
< 2Z

; then D
0
(I
2
) = [
3I
2
+I
1
4
;
I
2
+I
1
2
]: As
I
2
+I
1
2
< Z

; D(I
2
) =
0:
If I
1
< 0; the deviation of
~
I
2
=  I
1
=) D(
~
I
2
) = [0;
 I
1
2
] (as now
~
I
2
2 Z
0
) =)
M(
~
I
2
) > 0 as I
1
6= 0:
If I
1
= 0; the deviation of
~
I
2
= Z =) D(
~
I
2
) = [
Z
2
;
3Z
4
] (as now
~
I
2
2 Z
0
) =)M(
~
I
2
) > 0
as Z 6= 0:
So for I
1
 0 consider I
2
>  2Z

: D(I
2
)  D
0
(I
2
) = [
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
1
+3I
2
4
] =) D(I
2
) 
D
0
(I
2
) = [
I
1
+I
2
2
; Z]: If this set is empty then consider the deviations above.
Now consider D
0
(I
2
) 6=  (so
I
1
+I
2
2
< Z) and let
~
I
2
=  2Z

: D(
~
I
2
) = [
I
1
+
~
I
2
2
;
I
1
+3
~
I
2
4
] =)
D(I
2
) = [
I
1
+
~
I
2
2
; Z] as I
1
 2Z

(the lemma is now applicable):
As
~
I
2
< I
2
; and [
I
1
+
~
I
2
2
;
I
1
+I
2
2
] is measurable then D
0
(I
2
)  D(
~
I
2
) and so it must be
that M(
~
I
2
) > M(I
2
): I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
Case 4 I
1
= 2Z: Show that I
2
=  2Z is a strict best response for I
2
:
 I
2
=  2Z: We have D(I
1
) = [Z; 0]; D(I
2
) = [0; Z] =)M(I
2
) =
1
2
:
 I
2
 Z: E = fmax[I
1
; I
2
]g
+
: If I
1
 I
2
then D(I
2
)  [I
1
; I
2
]; or if I
1
> I
2
then
D(I
2
)  [I
2
; I
1
]: Either way this implies that D(I
2
) = 0: And so M(I
2
) = 0:
 Z < I
2
<  2Z: We have M(I
2
)  0: For M(I
2
) = 0 we are done. For M(I
2
) > 0
consider
~
I
2
= I
2
+; where  > 0; and such that
~
I
2
 2Z: Then I
2
will win districts
with measure
3
4
but lose districts with, at most, measure

2
: If g is strictly quasi-
concave then by Condition 1, M(
~
I
2
) > M(I
2
): So as
~
I
2
! 2Z; M(
~
I
2
) is increasing
and approaching M(I
2
= 2Z) =
1
2
: So for I
2
< 2Z we have M(I
2
) <
1
2
:
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This is not necessarily true for g strictly quasi-convex. If I
2
was to win districts in an
interval of length jZj on g; then it can be seen that the optimal location of this interval
is [Z; 0]; or [0; Z]; in which case M(I
2
) =
1
2
: For I
2
< 2Z the measure of D(I
2
) is less
than
1
2
: As G is strictly increasing once G(:) > 0; we must have M(I
2
) <
1
2
for I
2
< 2Z:
 I
2
>  2Z: D
0
(I
2
) = [
2Z+I
2
2
;
2Z+3I
2
4
] =) D(I
2
) = [
2Z+I
2
2
; Z]:
And as 2Z + I
2
> 0 we have M(I
2
) <
1
2
:
So I
2
=  2Z is a strict best response for I
2
: Therefore fI
1
; I
2
g = f2Z; 2Zg is a strict
equilibrium, consequently it is the only equilibrium involving I
1
= 2Z or I
2
=  2Z:
Case 5 I
1
; I
2
=2 Z
0
:
There is entry in every district. For the case I
1
< 2Z

; I
2
>  2Z

the entrants locate
between the incumbents. This is because
jI
1
 I
2
j
2
> 2Z

; and using the arguments of
lemma 2 an entrant centering its interval of voters won at the median in a district will
win that district. When I
1
; I
2
< 2Z

entry at E = [maxfI
1
; I
2
g]
+
wins every district. So
we have that M(I
1
) = M(I
2
) = 0: Recall that it was assumed that if successful entry
was possible then only one new party would enter and win the district.
 I
1
; I
2
< 2Z

:
- Let I
1
< I
2
:
For a district with median z
l
2 [Z;Z], I
2
's vote share is given by F (I
2
 z
l
) F (
I
2
+I
1
2
 
z
l
): If
~
I
2
= 2Z

then E =
~
I
+
2
and now V
I
2
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
) = F (2Z

  z
l
)   F (
2Z

+I
1
2
  z
l
) >
F (I
2
  z
l
)  F (
I
2
+I
1
2
  z
l
) as I
2
;
~
I
2
< Z and f(2Z

  z
l
) > 0: Consequently I
2
is strictly
better o. No equilibrium.
- Let I
1
= I
2
:
Then, for a district with median z
l
, I
1
's vote share approaches
1
2
F (I
1
  z
l
) as "! 0:
If F (I
1
  z
l
) 6= 0 for any z
l
then as F is strictly increasing once F (:) > 0,  small
enough can be found s.t.
~
I
1
= I
1
   =) V
I
1
(lj
~
I
1
; I
2
) = F (I
1
 

2
  z
l
) >
1
2
F (I
1
  z
l
) and
so I
1
is weakly better o in every district and strictly better o in some.
If F (I
1
) = 0 for all z
l
then consider
~
I
2
= 2Z

. As above this implies E =
~
I
+
1
and V
I
1
(lj
~
I
1
; I
2
) > 0 for all z
l
: And so I
1
's vote share increases in every district. No
equilibrium.
 I
1
< 2Z

; I
2
>  2Z

:
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Let jI
1
j  jI
2
j : Earlier it was shown that when an entrant locates between incumbents
it optimizes by choosing E such that V
I
1
= V
I
2
if it can, or by approaching the incumbent
closest to the median voter.
So we can see immediately that V
I
1
(z
l
 0)  V
I
2
(z
l
 0): For districts where z
l
> 0,
it may be the case that I
2
is closer to the median. I wish to show that even in these
districts V
I
1
(z
l
> 0)  V
I
2
(z
l
> 0): Consider district l where z
l
> 0: For this result to not
hold we require that f(
I
1
+I
2
2
  z
l
) < f(I
2
 Z) so that there doesn't exist an E such that
V
I
1
= V
I
2
: But as jI
1
j  jI
2
j we get that
I
1
+I
2
2
 0 =)
I
1
+I
2
2
  z
l
 Z: Also I
2
> 2Z

and so I
2
  z
l
> Z: Therefore f(
I
1
+I
2
2
  z
l
) > f(I
2
  Z) and so V
I
1
(l)  V
I
2
(l) for all
z
l
2 [Z;Z]:
Now consider a deviation by I
2
to
~
I
2
=  2Z

: As jI
1
j >



~
I
2



; V
I
1
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E) 
V
I
2
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E) for all districts. In every district the entrant will still locate between the
incumbents. As



~
I
2
 I
1
2



<


I
2
 I
1
2


the vote share for the entrant in each district must
decline. And so V
I
1
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E) + V
I
2
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E) > V
I
1
(l) + V
I
2
(l) for every l: As V
I
1
(l) 
V
I
2
(l) and V
I
1
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E)  V
I
2
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E) we must have that V
I
2
(ljI
1
;
~
I
2
; E) > V
I
2
(l) for
every l: And so I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
Case 6 I
1
2 H; I
2
2 Z
0
=
^
H:
If I
1
; I
2
 0 then I
1
2 (2Z; 0]; I
2
2 [2Z

; 2Z): D(I
2
) = [
I
1
+3I
2
4
;
I
1
+I
2
2
] =) D(I
2
) = 
as
I
1
+I
2
2
< Z: Thus M(I
2
) = 0: If I
1
< 0 then consider the deviation
~
I
2
=  I
1
: If I
1
= 0
then consider the deviation
~
I
2
= Z: Both deviations imply, as shown previously, that
M(
~
I
2
) > 0: No equilibrium. Likewise for I
1
; I
2
 0:
So consider I
1
< 0 and I
2
2 (2Z; 2Z

]: Thus D(I
2
) = [
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
1
+3I
2
4
] =) D(I
2
) =
[
I
1
+I
2
2
; Z]; as
I
1
+3I
2
4
> Z: Now consider the deviation,
~
I
2
= I
2
  ;  > 0; such that
I
1
+3
~
I
2
4
= Z: Then D(
~
I
2
) = [
I
1
+
~
I
2
2
;
I
1
+3
~
I
2
4
] =) D(
~
I
2
) = [
I
1
+I
2
 
2
; Z]: And so D(I
2
)  D(
~
I
2
)
and I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
9.2.2 Proposition 1A
The proof is identical to that for Proposition 1, with Condition 1A substituted for Condi-
tion 1. The extra restriction in Condition 1A ensures that the arguments of Proposition
1 can also be used to prove Proposition 1A.
9.2.3 Proposition 2
Using the notation of the previous section, we can see that for I
1
 I
2
we have D
0
=
[
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
I
1
+3I
2
4
]: As D  D
0
to preclude entry we require
3I
1
+I
2
4
 Z and
I
1
+3I
2
4
 Z:
Solving these two requirements simultaneously and recalling that Z =  Z; we have
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I1
 2Z and I
2
  2Z: As Z < Z

this implies that I
1
< 2Z

and I
2
>  2Z

; but then
we will have entry between the incumbents in every district (see Proposition 1, case 5).
So there does not exist a pair of locations for the incumbents which are able to preclude
entry in every district. Thus, there does not exist an equilibrium which precludes entry
in all districts.
9.2.4 Proposition 3
This proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1, in many instances the only dierence
being a change in the domain of a case.
Dene H
#
= (2Z
#
; 2Z
#
); and
^
H
#
= closure(H
#
):
Case 1 I
1
I
2
2 H
#
:
Proceed as with Case 1 in Proposition 1. We can ignore quasi-convexity requirement.
No equilibrium.
Case 2 I
1
; I
2
2 Z
0
=
^
H
#
:
 Consider rstly 2Z
#
 Z:
(a) I
1
; I
2
< 2Z
#
Then E = I
+
2
wins all districts, M(I
1
) = M(I
2
) = 0: Consider
~
I
2
=  I
1
: D(I
2
) =
[0;
~
I
2
2
] =)M(I
2
) > 0: I
2
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
(b) I
1
< 2Z
#
; I
2
>  2Z
#
:
Let jI
1
j  = jI
2
j ; where  > 0: Now D(I
1
) = [
 I
2
2
 
3
4
;
 
2
] and D(I
2
) = [
 
2
;
I
2
2
 

4
]:
If
3I
1
+I
2
4
< Z then the deviation
~
I
1
= I
1
+; such that
3
~
I
1
+I
2
4
= Z; makes I
1
strictly better
o (see Proposition 1, case 2). For
3I
1
+I
2
4
 Z we shall consider two deviations. Consider
~
I
1
=  I
2
; and
~
I
2
=  I
1
: When I
1
deviates with
~
I
1
=  I
2
we nd D(
~
I
1
) = [
 I
2
2
; 0] =)
M(
~
I
1
) =M(I
1
)+ [G(0) G(
 
2
)]  [G(
 I
2
2
) G(
 I
2
2
 
3
4
)]: If [G(0) G(
 
2
)] > [G(
 I
2
2
) 
G(
 I
2
2
 
3
4
)] then I
1
will deviate. No equilibrium. Otherwise consider the deviation by I
2
:
In this case we nd D(
~
I
2
) = [0;
I
2
+
2
] =)M(
~
I
2
) = M(I
2
)+[G(
I
2
+
2
) G(
I
2
2
 

4
)] [G(0) 
G(
 
2
)]: By the symmetry of g; G(
I
2
+
2
) G(
I
2
2
 

4
) > G(
 I
2
2
) G(
 I
2
2
 
3
4
): And so if it
isn't protable for I
1
to deviate then we have [G(
I
2
+
2
) G(
I
2
2
 

4
)] > [G(0) G(
 
2
)] =)
M(
~
I
2
) > M(I
2
); and so it is then protable for I
2
to deviate. So no equilibrium.
Now for I
1
< 2Z
#
; I
2
>  2Z
#
; let jI
1
j = jI
2
j : And so D(I
1
) = [
I
1
2
; 0]: If I
1
deviates
inwards,
~
I
1
= I
1
+; and so D(
~
I
1
) = [
I
1
2
+
3
4
;

2
]: As we know that
I
1
2
< Z
#
then we have
g(
I
1
2
) <
2
3
g(0): Because g is continuous there exists a  small enough such that 8
0
< ;
g(
I
1
2
+
3
0
4
) <
2
3
g(

0
2
); which implies that M(
~
I
1
) > M(I
1
) as then I
1
gains more districts
in the center than it loses on the fringe. No equilibrium.
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 Now consider Z < 2Z
#
:
For I
1
< 0; I
2
> 0 this is the same as for Z  2Z
#
: So from now assume that
I
1
; I
2
< 2Z
#
: We recall that by setting
~
I
1
=  I
2
, M(I
1
) > 0; and likewise for I
2
;
so in equilibrium we require that M(I
1
);M(I
2
) > 0: Considering positions such that
M(I
1
);M(I
2
) > 0 and noting that I
1
= I
2
=) M(I
1
) = M(I
2
) = 0 we need only
consider I
1
< I
2
< 2Z
#
: Consider now the deviation
~
I
2
= I
2
+ ; such that
~
I
2
< 2Z
#
:
Then D(
~
I
2
) = D(I
2
)+[
I
1
+3I
2
4
;
I
1
+3I
2
4
+
3
4
]  [
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
1
+I
2
2
+

2
]: As
~
I
2
< 0 then as M(I
2
) > 0
and g is strictly increasing on this domain it implies thatM(
~
I
2
) > M(I
2
): No equilibrium.
Case 3 I
1
2 Z
0
; I
2
=2 Z
0
:
Proceed as with Case 3 in Proposition 1. No equilibrium.
Case 4 I
1
= 2Z
#
: Show that I
2
=  2Z
#
is a strict best response for I
2
; given that g
is concave, and show that when g is not concave I
2
6=  2Z
#
cannot constitute an
equilibrium.
 I
2
=  2Z
#
: We have D(I
1
) = [Z
#
; 0]; D(I
2
) = [0; Z
#
] =)M(I
2
) =
1
2
 G(Z
#
):
The rest of the locations for I
2
are shown to produce M(I
2
) <
1
2
  G(Z
#
) with
the same techniques as in Proposition 1 and thus can't constitute equilibria. The only
addition to the proof is for I
1
< I
2
when 2Z
#
> Z (when there are districts to the left
of I
1
).
For g concave we need to make sure that there isn't more density on the anks that
would make I
2
better o. We have that g(Z
#
) <
2
3
g(0); and so by the concavity of g;
we also have g(2Z
#
) <
1
3
g(0); and g(3Z
#
) = 0: So for I
2
< I
1
; D(I
2
)  [I
2
; I
1
] and its
measure is bounded by
j
Z
#
j
4
: And so M(I
2
) is bounded by G(Z
#
) G(Z
#
 
j
Z
#
j
4
) which
by the concavity of g implies M(I
2
) <
1
2
 G(Z
#
): So I
2
=  2Z
#
is a strict best response
for I
2
when g is concave: So fI
1
; I
2
g = f2Z
#
; 2Z
#
g is a strict equilibrium, and therefore
is the only equilibrium involving I
1
= 2Z
#
or I
2
=  2Z
#
:
If g is not concave then I
2
may wish to locate at some point such that I
2
< I
1
: In
this case we need to show that I
1
would have incentive to deviate, thus precluding an
equilibrium. Consider
~
I
1
= I
1
+ ; then D(
~
I
1
) = [
~
I
1
+I
2
2
;
3
~
I
1
+I
2
4
] = D(I) + [
3I
1
+I
2
4
;
3I
1
+I
2
4
+
3
4
] [
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
1
+I
2
2
+
1
2
]: As,for small enough ; g is strictly increasing over this range then I
1
is strictly better o. So for quasi-concave g functions I
2
6=  2Z
#
can't be an equilibrium.
Thus if an equilibrium exists in this domain then it must be fI
1
; I
2
g = f2Z
#
; 2Z
#
g:
Case 5 I
1
; I
2
=2 Z
0
:
Proceed as with Case 5 in Proposition 1. No equilibrium.
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Case 6 I
1
2 H
#
; I
2
2 Z
0
=
^
H
#
:
If I
1
; I
2
 0 and
I
1
+I
2
2
 Z then we proceed as in Proposition 1. Likewise for I
1
; I
2
 0:
No equilibrium. So consider Z
#
>
I
1
+I
2
2
> Z; where D(I
1
) = D(I
1
) = [
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
2
+3I
1
4
]: For
I
1
< 0 let
~
I
1
=
I
1
2
: Then D(
~
I
1
) = D(
~
I
1
) = [
~
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
2
+3
~
I
1
4
] = [
I
1
+I
2
2
 
I
1
4
;
I
2
+3I
1
4
 
3I
1
8
]: As
I
1
2
< 0 then the strict quasi-concavity and symmetry of g imply thatM(I
1
) < M(
~
I
1
); and
so I
1
is strictly better o. No equilibrium. Consider now I
1
= 0: Let
~
I
1
= ; where  > 0
is such that


I
2
+3
4


< 0: And thenD(
~
I
1
) = D(
~
I
1
) = [
~
I
1
+I
2
2
;
I
2
+3
~
I
1
4
] = [
I
1
+I
2
2
+

2
;
I
2
+3I
1
4
+
3
4
],
and once again by the strict quasi-concavity and symmetry of g, M(I
1
) < M(
~
I
1
); and so
I
1
is strictly better o. No equilibrium.
So consider I
1
2 (2Z
#
; 0) and I
2
2 ( 2Z
#
; 2Z

]: As jI
1
j < jI
2
j we have that
I
1
+I
2
2
> 0. If
I
1
+3I
2
4
> Z then set
~
I
2
= I
2
  ; such that
I
1
+3
~
I
2
4
= Z (as in Proposition 1).
And so D(I
1
)  D(
~
I
1
) and I
1
is strictly better o. No equilibrium. So consider where
I
1
+3I
2
4
 Z: Now analyze dual deviations by the incumbents as done in Case 2 of this
result. At least one incumbent has incentive to deviate. No equilibrium.
9.2.5 Run-O
I will proceed by showing that the two incumbents cannot choose platforms such that
entry is prevented in all districts. Thus, in any potential equilibrium there must be entry
of third parties.
Consider the central district with the incumbents located asymmetrically. Let jI
1
j =
jI
2
j   ;  > 0: Now, if I
1
,I
2
< 0 then E = 0 =) P (W = E) = 1 and so entry occurs:
we are done. Therefore consider I
1
< 0; I
2
> 0:
If E 2 I
+
1
then V
E
! F (
I
1
+I
2
2
) F (I
1
) = F (

2
) F (I
1
); V
I
1
! F (I
1
); V
I
2
! 1 F (

2
):
As jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j to prevent entry we require at least that 1 F (

2
)  F (

2
) F (I
1
) =)
F (

2
) 
1
2
(1 + F (I
1
)); and F (I
1
)  F (

2
)  F (I
1
) =) F (

2
)  2F (I
1
):
If E 2 I
 
1
then V
E
! F (I
1
); V
I
1
! F (

2
)   F (I
1
); V
I
2
= 1   F (

2
): As jEj > jI
1
j to
prevent entry we may require V
I
1
> V
E
=) F (

2
)   F (I
1
)  F (I
1
) =) F (

2
)  2F (I
1
):
Combined with the rst necessary conditions this implies that F (

2
) = 2F (I
1
): That this
requirement must hold with equality means that we must also ensure that if E 2 I
+
1
then
E doesn't beat or tie with I
1
for strictly positive values of " (that is E loses in the limit
but wins at points on the convergent path). A sucient condition for this to happen is
that there exists a  such that f(

2
+)  2f(I
1
+ ): If this is true then E = I
1
+2 =)
V
E
= F (

2
+) F (I
1
+)  F (

2
) F (I
1
)+F (I
1
+) F (I
1
) = F (I
1
+) = V
I
1
: Which
implies P (W = E) > 0 and so entry occurs.
Alternatively, if V
I
1
 V
E
then we require V
I
1
> V
I
2
which implies F (

2
) 
1
2
(1+F (I
1
)):
Combining this with the above conditions implies F (

2
) =
1
2
(1 + F (I
1
)):
So one or both of these two identities must hold for the central district.
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 Assume both conditions hold. That is, F (

2
) = 2F (I
1
) and F (

2
) =
1
2
(1 + F (I
1
)):
This implies that F (I
1
) =
1
3
and F (

2
) =
2
3
: Therefore

2
=  I
1
: Consider E = I
1
+:
Then V
E
= F (

2
+

2
)  F (I
1
+

2
) <
1
3
< V
I
1
and V
I
2
= 1  F (

2
+

2
):
V
E
  V
I
2
= 2F (

2
+

2
)  F (I
1
+

2
)  1:
lim
!0
(V
E
  V
I
2
) = 2F (

2
)  F (I
1
)  1 = 2:
2
3
 
1
3
  1 = 0:
d(V
E
 V
I
2
)
d
= f(

2
+

2
) 
1
2
f(I
1
+

2
):
By the continuity and symmetry of f (recall  I
1
=

2
) then 9

such that 8 2
(0;

); f(

2
+

2
) >
1
2
f(I
1
+

2
): Thus 9 such that jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j and V
E
> V
I
1
=)
P (W = E) = 1 and so entry must still occur.
Thus if both conditions are satised for the central district then entry must still occur
and we are done. So I shall now consider when each condition is satised alone. If one
of these conditions doesn't hold for the central district then by the continuity of F there
exists an interval, [; 0), of district medians in which this condition can't hold either.
Thus when we consider these districts in the following cases the sole condition that held
for the central district is the only one that can hold in these districts as well. Thus if I
can show that the condition that held in the central district can't simultaneously hold
in these other districts and prevent entry, then I will have shown that third party entry
will occur. This is the method of the following cases.
 Considering F (

2
) = 2F (I
1
) rstly.
Consider districts [ ; 0] where j j < jI
1
j : This implies that

2
    > 0 (as   < 0): To
preclude entry in each district we need F (

2
  ) = 2F (I
1
  ) 8 2 [ ; 0]: Therefore as
 changes
@
@
F (

2
  ) =
@
@
2F (I
1
  ) =)  f(

2
  ) =  2f(I
1
  ): As I
1
   < 0 and

2
   > 0 this can only be true if f(I
1
  ) =
1
2
f(

2
  ) = constant, for all  2 [ ; 0];
otherwise the condition is violated and entry occurs. If f(I
1
 ) =
1
2
f(

2
 ) = constant,
for all  2 [ ; 0]; then the additional sucient condition for entry above (where E wins
on the convergent path) holds and E = I
1
+ 2 for any  2 [ ; 0]; implies V
E
 V
I
1
and
E enters.
 Consider F (

2
) =
1
2
(1 + F (I
1
)):
Similarly to the case above, by considering districts [; 0] where jj < jI
1
j we can
establish that if entry is to be prevented f(I
1
  ) = 2f(

2
  ) 8 2 [; 0]: But as
V
I
1
> V
I
2
this leads to (as  < 0) E = I
1
   =) V
E
= F (

2
 

2
)   F (I
1
 

2
) =
F (

2
)   F (I
1
)   [F (

2
 

2
)   F (

2
)] = 1   F (

2
 

2
) = V
I
2
, by the condition on f
and the identity F (

2
) =
1
2
(1 + F (I
1
)): And so V
E
= V
I
2
; combined with the fact that
jEj < jI
1
j ; jI
2
j this implies that P (W = E) > 0 and so E will enter.
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Thus, for 0 6= jI
1
j < jI
2
j the incumbents are unable to preclude entry in all districts.
So consider where jI
1
j = jI
2
j : For any  2 (0; Z) the incumbents are asymmetric in that
district and so the analysis from above holds for any  if we consider districts  2 [

2
; Z].
Also consider jI
1
j = 0 < jI
2
j : Then 8z
r
2 [Z; 0) which is measurable as Z 6= 0; we have
I
1
  z
r
; I
2
  z
r
> 0 and so E = I
 
1
=) P (W = E) = 1: Therefore there is successful
entry in these districts.
9.2.6 Theorem 1
This result is merely a combination of the previous results. It is stated in order to give a
clear representation of what has been established. Its proof simply refers to the previous
results.
Sucient=) then we have the conditions for Proposition 1. No entry happens. Final
outcome involves two parties. Duverger's Law holds.
Necessary=) Without Condition 2 we satisfy the requirements for Proposition 2.
There is entry in every district. Final outcome involves three or more parties. Duverger's
Law fails. Without Condition 1 we satisfy the conditions for Proposition 3. There is entry
in intervals of districts on the edges of the distribution of district median voters. Final
outcome involves three or more parties. Duverger's Law fails.
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       Figure 1
Depending on F, symmetric equilibria
may exist in these
intervals
             The pdf f
   F-1(1/4)      W*      F-1(1/3)    0    F-1(2/3)   -W*        F-1(3/4)
         Symmetric equilibria exist in this interval with certainty
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